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[Un]Usual Suspects: Deservingness, 
Scarcity, and Disability Rights 
Doron Dorfman* 
People encounter disability in public spaces where accommodations are granted to those 
who fit into this protected legal class. Nondisabled people desire many of these 
accommodations—such as the use of reserved parking spots or the ability to avoid waiting in 
a queue—and perceive them as “special rights” prone to abuse. This apprehension about the 
exploitation of rights by those pretending to be disabled, which I refer to as “fear of the 
disability con,” erodes trust in disability law and affects people with disabilities both on an 
individual level and a group level. Individuals with disabilities are often harassed or questioned 
about their identity when using their rights. As a group, disabled people are forced to navigate 
new defensive policies that seek to address widely held perceptions of fakery and abuse. This 
Article uses a series of survey experiments conducted with multiple nationally representative 
samples totaling more than 3200 Americans along with forty-seven qualitative in-depth 
interviews. It brings to light the psychological mechanism of suspicion and identifies factors 
that motivate fear of the disability con in public spaces. Findings counterintuitively suggest 
that the scarcity of the desired public resources has no effect on the level of suspicion against 
potential abusers. Rather, it is the sense of deservingness (or lack thereof) in the eyes of others 
that drives suspicion. Using these empirical findings, as well as analysis of relevant case law, 
this Article outlines the normative implications for the design and implementation of laws 
affecting millions of individuals. Furthermore, this research contributes to our understanding 
of how rights behave on the ground, both with regard to disability and to myriad  
distributive policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2018, two men in Florida were assaulted in separate incidents occurring 
three days apart. One man was critically stabbed and the other shot dead. Those 
assaults were initiated by a “self-appointed guardian of disabled parking spaces 
[who] decide[ed] someone doesn’t belong in such a place and confront[ed] the 
person.”1 A month later, in the same state, an appeal that challenged a new policy 
 
*Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. J.S.D., J.S.M. Stanford Law School; 
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for visitors with disabilities in Disney parks due to perceived abuse of rules by 
people faking disabilities was decided in the Eleventh Circuit.2 At first glance, these 
two cases seem unrelated. However, I argue that they point to much broader issues 
regarding the ethics of using disability accommodations and to a moral panic about 
abuse of rights by “nondisabled fakers.” In this Article, I use two case studies of 
disabled parking and queuing in theme parks as the basis for an original study that 
investigates perceptions of fairness, noncompliance, and deservingness. The 
empirical findings from this research reach beyond disability law and contribute to 
the understanding of decision-making processes on the allocation of goods and 
determination of eligibility for compensation, public goods, services, or benefits. 
People’s beliefs about fairness, justice, and trust in others are the core 
antecedent of the willingness to cooperate voluntarily and stand behind laws and 
policies.3 This is especially true in regard to distributive laws that ask people to 
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Law Center Bradley fellowship, and the Perla & Samuel Rubinstein Scholarship for Disability Studies 
and Universal Design awarded by the Alin Beit Noam Institute for Disability Studies. I would like to 
give special thanks to my incredible doctoral committee Robert MacCoun, Susan Schweik, Bernnadette 
Meyler, Rabia Belt, and Hazel Markus. I would also like to thank Lauren Edelman, Michael Ashley 
Stein, Deborah Hensler, Elizabeth Emens, Katharina Heyer, Barbara Fried, Sagit Mor, Elizabeth Katz, 
Diego Gil, Roni Holler, Mariela Yabo, Jef Pearlman, Orli Oren-Kolbinger, Mark Storslee, Zachary  
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Conference at UC Irvine School of Law (2018), the 13th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies 
(CELS) at the University of Michigan Law School (2018), the Disability Legal Studies CRN panel at the 
Law & Society Association Annual Meeting in Toronto (2018), and at a talk at the Harvard Law School 
Project on Disability at Harvard Law School (2018). Thank you to the members of the J.S.D. program 
at Stanford Law School for the engagement with this work and their helpful feedback. Finally, I would 
like to thank the anonymous interviewees for this research for sharing their experiences with me.  
 1. Howard Cohen, They Fought over a Handicapped Parking Spot, Cops Say. Now a  
Man Is Fighting for His Life, MIAMI HERALD (July 18, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/ 
local/crime/article215084395.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20180719110844/https:// 
www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article215084395.html ]; Julia Jacobs, ‘Stand Your Ground’ 
Cited by Florida Sheriff Who Declined to Arrest Suspect in Killing, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/us/florida-stand-your-ground.html [https://perma.cc/DYL9-MP 
3V]. 
2. A.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc., 900 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2018). 
3. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1  
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115, 121–22 (1999); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model 
of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 403 (2001); Tom R. Tyler, Why Do People Rely on Others? 
Social Identity and Social Aspects of Trust, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 285, 285–87 (Karen S. Cook ed., 2001); 
Katharine G. Young, Rights and Queues: On Distributive Contests in the Modern State, 55  
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 65, 88 (2016). 
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allocate valuable resources to other members of society.4 Western societies 
increasingly rely on formal rules and legal rights to regulate interactions and 
exchanges between their members.5 When a “cheater” violates the rules by taking 
advantage of the benefits offered while failing to meet the expected requirements,6 
the balance and evolution of exchange are threatened.7 Scholars argue that as a 
consequence, individuals are continually vigilant, trying to detect cheaters.8 
How do people assess the legitimacy of rights? What drives the support of 
certain policies and pushback against others? Is it the rational pursuit of  
self-interest, driven by the idea of sharing scarce resources, or is it views about the 
beneficiaries’ deservingness,9 motivated by the desire to enforce rules of fairness 
and to prevent cheaters? This Article answers these questions by looking at the case 
of disability rights and accommodations—an area of law considered rife with 
abuse—resulting in mistrust in its policies and its beneficiaries. The Article also 
empirically proves that perceptions of ethics and fairness trump the pursuit of  
self-interest in circumstances of scarcity. 
The last three decades have brought about a significant shift in the legal 
treatment of Americans with disabilities. With the enactment of the omnibus 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990,10 disability has graduated from 
being the subject of charity or goodwill to being recognized as a matter of civil 
 
4. NORMAN T. FEATHER, VALUES, ACHIEVEMENT, AND JUSTICE: STUDIES IN THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF DESERVINGNESS 169–70 (1999); Rourke L. O’Brien, Monetizing Illness: The Influence 
of Disability Assistance Priming on How We Evaluate the Health Symptoms of Others, 128  
SOC. SCI. & MED. 31, 32, 34 (2015) (showing how the prospect of taxpayer funded public benefits 
alters the way one evaluates others’ deservingness); Young, supra note 3, at 88. 
5. BARBARA A. MISZTAL, INFORMALITY: SOCIAL THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE 
77 (2000). 
6. In a situation that may create a “sucker effect,” when other members of a group appear to 
be free-riding, one would be less motivated to make an effort and follow the rules themselves in order 
not to play the “sucker role.” See Norbert L. Kerr, Motivation Losses in Small Groups: A Social Dilemma 
Analysis, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 819, 820–21 (1983); Ashley Simms & Tommy 
Nicholas, Social Loafing: A Review of the Literature, 15 J. MGMT. POL’Y & PRAC. 58, 63 (2014). 
7. Leda Cosmides, The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Human 
Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task, 31 COGNITION 187, 197–98 (1989); Elain Walster, Ellen 
Berscheid & G. William Walster, The Exploited: Justice or Justification?, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING 
BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 179, 
181 ( J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz eds., 1970). 
8. Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptation for Social Exchange, in THE ADAPTED 
MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 163, 180–81 (Jerome  
H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby eds., 1992). 
9. Norman Feather, as well as some other scholars, prefer the term “entitlement” to describe 
situations where claims for some outcome are codified in laws or can be traced back to social norms. 
Accordingly, deservingness should refer to “judgments about outcomes that are associated with a 
person’s actions.” Norman T. Feather, Deservingness, Entitlement, and Reactions to Outcomes, in THE JUSTICE 
MOTIVE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 334, 336–38 (Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., 2002). Nevertheless, in 
this Article, I will use the term deservingness when referring to people’s evaluations of individuals’ use 
of codified disability rights and accommodations, as this is the more common expression used in the 
literature. 
10. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (2012)). 
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rights.11 The ADA broke new ground in American legal tradition, not only by 
prohibiting disability discrimination in all areas of public life but also by further 
combining a distributive element of “positive rights” that compels the state and 
private actors to affirmatively provide accommodations for disabled people.12 This 
is while most American civil rights law is grounded in the tradition of negative rights, 
prohibiting government interference with private behavior.13 After almost three 
decades since the ADA’s enactment, however, and despite the fact that disability 
rights have become ubiquitous in everyday life, laypeople do not seem to fully grasp 
disability as a civil rights issue and have difficulty accepting accommodations as 
positive rights. 
Fitting into the “special administrative category” of disability gives some 
people “privileges” (in fact accommodations) that nondisabled individuals often 
desire.14 These so-called privileges include, for example, the right to park in reserved 
spots even when parking is limited or to go to the front of long lines.15 As a 
consequence, disability rights are often perceived as prone to abuse. Those using 
such accommodations, who already belong to a stigmatized group, are encountering 
another type of stereotype: they are regarded as faking their disabilities and abusing 
the law to gain an unfair advantage. I refer to this perception of a “national epidemic 
of horrible people pretending to be disabled”16 as “fear of the disability con.”17 In 
previous work, I demonstrated how the suspicion of the disability con is prevalent 
 
11. RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING CIVIL 
DISABILITY POLICY 10–11 (2d ed. 2001); Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to 
Do with It or an Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 445 (2011); 
Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, 
43 EMORY L.J. 245, 255 (1994). 
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack 
Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 6 (2005). 
13. See KATHARINA HEYER, RIGHTS ENABLED: THE DISABILITY REVOLUTION, FROM THE 
US, TO GERMANY AND JAPAN, TO THE UNITED NATIONS 44–45 (2015); STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 40–41 (1999); Michael 
Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 1203, 1209 (2006); 
Mark Tushnet, Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1392–93 (1984). 
14. In her 1984 book, written before the enactment of the ADA, Deborah Stone writes, “The 
argument that disability functions as a privileged category is meant in the very precise sense: the state 
accords special treatment to some people who are disabled.” DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED 
STATE 4 (1984). Although Stone referred mostly to public benefits in her analysis, this idea can be 
extended to other disability rights and accommodations granted by the ADA. 
15. DANA S. DUNN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF DISABILITY 21 (2015); MICHELLE  
NARIO-REDMOND, ABLEISM: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DISABILITY PREJUDICE 203 
(2019). 
16. Brad Tuttle, National Epidemic of Horrible People Pretending to Be Disabled, TIME (Oct. 12, 
2013), http://business.time.com/2013/10/12/national-epidemic-of-horrible-people-pretending-to-
be-disabled/ [https://perma.cc/J727-MNBZ]. 
17. The term “disability con” was originally coined by English professor and disability studies 
scholar Ellen Samuels, who described how the idea of malingering and “faking” a disability was 
portrayed in literary pieces and cultural products. See, e.g., ELLEN SAMUELS, FANTASIES OF 
IDENTIFICATION: DISABILITY, GENDER, RACE 28 (2014); Ellen Samuels, From Melville to Eddie 
Murphy: The Disability Con in American Literature and Film, 8 LEVIATHAN 61 (2006). 
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among the American public and how it cuts across different types of disability 
rights: academic accommodations in educational settings, disabled parking 
privileges, Social Security benefits, and the use of service animals.18 I also pointed 
out that people with disabilities are reluctant to ask for accommodations and 
disability-related rights due to the fear of being thought of as fakers or abusers.19 
This Article examines the psychological mechanism behind the everyday 
apprehension about the exploitation of rights by those “pretending” to be disabled. 
It uses a mixed-methods approach to uncover what factors affect laypeople’s 
suspicion of the disability con. By doing so, this Article makes two original 
contributions. First, it allows for the assessment of what drives people’s perceptions 
about fairness of rights and distributive legal mechanisms. Second, it explores an 
important yet unexplored barrier Americans with disabilities confront when trying 
to use their rights and accommodations in the public sphere: that of public suspicion 
about faking disabilities and abusing the law. This suspicion leads to harassment and 
to the creation of defensive policies that curtail the participation of disabled 
individuals in civic life. 
Using a series of survey experiments along with forty-seven qualitative 
interviews, this Article empirically assesses how fear of the disability con plays out 
in two case studies: the use of disabled parking placards and the policy allowing 
disabled visitors to skip lines at Disneyland.20 Both case studies involve 
accommodations put in place to allow persons with disabilities to better navigate 
the public space. 
The survey experiments, which I conducted with nationally representative 
samples totaling more than 3200 Americans,21 test the effect of two independent 
variables on the level of suspicion of the disability con: deservingness (measured 
through the proxy of the visibility of disability) and scarcity of resources. 
The term “deservingness” plays a central role in social policy studies on the 
 
18. See, e.g., Doron Dorfman, Fear of the Disability Con: Perceptions of Fraud and Special Rights 
Discourse, 53.4 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1051 (2019). 
19. Id. 
20.  I am aware that the expensive experience of visiting a Disney park is one reserved to those 
with great class privilege, which stands in contrast to the fact that people with disabilities usually belong 
to a lower social economic background. However, and as I discuss later, people with disabilities do visit 
Disney parks regularly, primarily because of their high level of accessibility. It is the prevalence of 
Disney parks in the lives of many individuals with disabilities that drew me to this case study. As 
articulated by blogger Katy St. Clair: “Many people with developmental disabilities make a trip to a 
Disney theme park their one vacation in life—yes, life. They live on Social Security, a very modest 
amount, and Disney parks aren’t cheap. A one-day Disneyland pass costs $99—and that doesn’t count 
parking, food, or gift shop purchases. If a person with disabilities gets a windfall—an inheritance, bonus 
at work, high-stakes Special Olympics betting payout—they need to dump it quickly, lest the 
government step in and snatch it. Naturally, their first choice is often to spend it like an NFL star who 
just won the big game.” Katy St. Clair, How Fakers with Wheelchairs Ruined Disneyland’s Disabled Line, 
BROADLY (Nov. 4, 2015), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/jpy3vy/how-fakers-with-
wheelchairs-ruined-disneylands-disabled-line [https://perma.cc/EU4P-CAMK]. 
21. For a detailed explanation of the research design and samples used for the experiments, see 
infra Part III. 
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welfare state.22 It refers to general public support for services and is usually 
measured using public opinion data.23 I expand the use of this term to also include 
accommodations outside of social benefits. To assess deservingness, I use the 
common misconception about how disability should manifest itself—being clearly 
visible and easily detectable—thus, presumably, signaling a higher degree of 
deservingness. Nonvisible or less apparent disability signals a lower degree of 
deservingness. 
By scarcity of resources, I refer to the availability of public resources in a 
specific scenario. In this research, scarcity refers to the abundance or lack of parking 
spots and to a short or long wait time in line for an attraction at Disneyland.24 My 
hypothesis is that the level of fear of the disability con will be higher when resources 
are scarce (parking lot full/an hour-long wait) in comparison with a situation in 
which there is no such problem (parking lot empty/a few minutes or no wait time). 
Disability law serves as a useful tool for studying public perceptions of trust 
and fairness because it is an area of law that is largely left for private enforcement 
by members of society, specifically in everyday situations in which formal law 
enforcement is absent (at least in the immediate sense). As legal scholar Sarah 
Marusek observes: 
Constitutive legal theory reminds us that law is made by everyday actors 
interpreting what the law really means. In this way, the non-disabled 
members of society have as much to say, if not more, about how the ADA 
works for the simple reason that, in my view, the non-disabled are those 
 
22. SUSANNE N. BEECHEY, SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE POLITICS OF DESERVINGNESS 35 
(2016); MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF 
ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 61–63, 92 (1999); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE 
WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE (1989); STEIN RINGEN, THE POSSIBILITY OF 
POLITICS: A STUDY IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WELFARE STATE 47–63 (1987); THEDA 
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 138 (1992); Wim Van Oorschot & Femke Roosma, The Social Legitimacy of 
Targeted Welfare and Welfare Deservingness, in THE SOCIAL LEGITIMACY OF TARGETED  
WELFARE: ATTITUDES TO WELFARE DESERVINGNESS 3, 4 (Wim Van Oorschot, Femke Roosma, 
Bart Meuleman & Tim Reeskens eds., 2017). For a fascinating experimental study about deservingness 
and Social Security disability benefits, see O’Brien, supra note 4 (showing that participants who were 
primed with information about an individual receiving government assistance were harsher in their 
evaluation of his or her disability i.e., less likely to say he or she lives with a disabling impairment and 
more likely to blame them for their condition). For the ways in which deservingness plays out in other 
areas of law, such as international investment law, see Sergio Puig & Anton Strezhnev, The David Effect 
and ISDS, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 731 (2017) (finding that international arbitrators were more likely to 
grant poorer states reimbursement of their legal costs compared to wealthy states, as the first were 
perceived to be more deserving). 
23. Van Oorschot & Roosma, supra note 22, at 5. 
24. Scarcity of resources has also been referred to as congestion: “The basic congestion problem 
involves a situation in which demand exceeds available supply. In other words, capacity is  
scarce . . . . This may lead to congestion, in the form of crowding, increased waiting time in queues, 
slower service, pollution, noise, reduced quality of service due to increased interruptions of service, and 
so on.” BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 
138–39 (2012). 
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who implement disability policy in everyday situations.25 
Using the two case studies and narratives by interviewees, I demonstrate how 
the fear of the disability con affects people with disabilities both on an individual 
and group level. Individuals with disabilities are often harassed or questioned about 
their status when making use of a disabled parking placard or theme park policy. 
Disabled people as a group are also forced to navigate new defensive policies that 
seek to address widely held perceptions of fraud and abuse by limiting the scope of 
the accommodations. The two case studies were chosen due to their wide public 
familiarity that stems from personal experience and from the attention they receive 
in media coverage and popular culture. The focus on case studies also allows for 
some assessment of the elusive nature and scope of the “objective” abuse. 
My findings show, perhaps counterintuitively, that the level of scarcity of 
public resources has no effect on levels of suspicion. It is the sense of deservingness 
(or lack thereof) that drives mistrust, as participants were always much more 
suspicious of a person with a nonvisible disability. These findings suggest that fear 
of the disability con is a matter of principle—that of perceived fairness, justice, and 
ethics, which goes beyond a simple cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, the findings 
show that those with an “inside view” of disability,26 disabled individuals and 
nondisabled people who have a personal relationship with a disabled person, were 
found generally less suspicious of disability con. These findings serve as the basis 
for proposed policy aimed at improving access, reducing the stigma of fraud, and 
increasing trust in disability law and its beneficiaries. The findings also hold valuable 
lessons for those studying public support and legitimacy of myriad distributive 
policies outside of the disability realm, such as health care,27 immigration,28 and 
mass torts.29 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I presents the socio-legal phenomenon 
of the public fear of the disability con. Part II introduces the mixed-methods 
methodology used in this research. Part III discusses the legal framework of the two 
 
25. SARAH MARUSEK, POLITICS OF PARKING: RIGHTS, IDENTITY, AND PROPERTY 139 (2012). 
26. DUNN, supra note 15, at 20–22; PAUL K. LONGMORE, TELETHONS: SPECTACLE, 
DISABILITY, AND THE BUSINESS OF CHARITY 98–99 (Catherine Kudlick ed., 2016); Elizabeth  
F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1386 (2012). 
27. JESSICA L. ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM: HEALTH-STATUS 
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 92, 100 (2018). 
28. For an empirical analysis of deservingness in the context of immigration policy in Europe, 
see Kirk Bansak, Jens Hainmueller & Dominik Hangartner, How Economic, Humanitarian, and Religious 
Concerns Shape European Attitudes Toward Asylum Seekers, 354 SCIENCE 217 (2016). 
29. For changing public notions about the deservingness in the context of mass torts, see 
Michele Landis Dauber, The War of 1812, September 11th, and the Politics of Compensation, 53 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 289, 345, 348 (2003) (documenting the shift in public views of victims of the 9/11 attacks and 
their family members, who received compensation, from viewing them as “deserving of charity” to 
“worthy of suspicion” for being greedy). For an enlightening description of the process of determining 
deservingness for compensation by decision-makers in various types of mass torts, see KENNETH  
R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL 
UPHEAVAL (2012). 
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case studies, the use of parking placards and the disability policy in Disneyland, the 
experiments conducted on each one, and the findings from these experiments. Part 
IV discusses the findings. Using interview data along with a variety of secondary 
sources, it discusses the effect of the suspicion on people with disabilities, which 
control variables had an effect on the level of suspicion, and data about the scope 
of abuse of disability rights. Part V delineates the normative implications of the 
findings for policy that would affect both disabled and nondisabled members of 
society. The conclusion explores ways of utilizing the findings and methodology in 
other legal areas other than within disability law. 
I. THE PERSISTENCE OF THE FEAR OF THE DISABILITY CON: 
FROM CHARITY TO RIGHTS 
People with disabilities have been historically excluded from the public sphere. 
In the late nineteenth century, people with physical disabilities (“any person who is 
diseased, maimed, mutilated, or in any way deformed”) or mental disabilities (“mad 
vagrants”) were considered “unsightly” and were banned from appearing in public 
by laws spreading across U.S. cities, known as the Ugly Laws.30 The Ugly Laws were 
enacted at a time in which urban begging had become widespread,31 and the 
regulation of the two closely related categories of disability and vagrancy became a 
priority both from the practical need to regulate the cityscape and from a moral 
standpoint.32 From an ethical standpoint, there was a need to protect the public 
from fraud by helping the layperson distinguish the true disabled beggars “worthy” 
of benevolence and charity from the “unworthy fake disabled beggars”;33 
“[d]isability, after all, could be faked, as could illness, hunger pains, and other 
sympathy-eliciting elements.”34 As a result, people with disabilities were forcibly 
institutionalized away from the public eye.35 The Ugly Laws remained on the books 
 
30. The first Ugly Law was passed in 1867 in San Francisco, but most of the others were passed 
in the 1880s and the 1890s. See SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC 24 
(2009). For the development of the legal category of an “unsightly beggar,” see id. at 25–26. 
31. Id.; Susan M. Ryan, Misgivings: Melville, Race, and the Ambiguities of Benevolence, 12  
AM. LITERARY HIST. 685, 686 (2000). The reason for the rise of urban begging is attributed to social 
transformations allowing greater geographic and social mobility that led to “constant confrontation 
with strangers [that] must have undermined people’s sense that they could understand one another. 
And nothing can be more threatening to a sense of social order than the perception that the boundaries 
between the real and the fake are suddenly blurred.” STONE, supra note 14, at 33. 
32. SCHWEIK, supra note 30, at 27; STONE, supra note 14, at 29. For the historic connection 
between poverty and disability, see Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of 
Welfare, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 809, 809 (1966). 
33. Yoshiaki Furui, “Secret Emotions”: Disability in Public and Melville’s The Confidence Man, 
15 LEVIATHAN 54, 56 (2013); SAMUELS, supra note 17, at 63; see also GEORGINA KLEEGE, SIGHT 
UNSEEN 20–21 (1999); SCHWEIK, supra note 30, at 111–12. 
34. Ryan, supra note 31, at 686. 
35. SCHWEIK, supra note 30, at 68–69. 
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for a century and were even occasionally enforced during the second half of the 
twentieth century.36 
Years later, the disability rights movement’s ongoing struggle for accessibility, 
which started in the early 1960s, demonstrates that the exclusion of persons with 
disabilities from the public sphere was not only the product of prejudice and stigma 
but also the outcome of exclusionary environments that disregard disability from 
early stages of planning and design.37 Without access, people with disabilities cannot 
benefit from the services and opportunities available to the nondisabled public and 
are not able to exercise their rights as equal citizens.38 Despite progressive disability 
rights legislation such as the ADA, put in place almost three decades ago to help 
disabled individuals navigate public spaces, this population remains 
undereducated,39 underemployed,40 and mostly absent from the public sphere.41 
As the most important factors contributing to the inequality and exclusion of 
people with disabilities are deeply rooted and structural, traditional 
antidiscrimination law is ill-equipped to fight such barriers.42 This is because 
prototypical antidiscrimination requirements entail that an entity treat similarly 
situated individuals the same whereas disability status often requires giving this class 
of persons something that is not needed for others in order to ensure this class’s 
inclusion.43 Therefore, the ADA includes a mandate determining that failure to 
provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities in the design of the 
physical environment, social structures, and policies is considered discrimination.44 
Many scholars view the idea of accommodations as a redistributive scheme in 
 
36. For the enforcement of the Ugly Laws in Omaha and Portland in the 1970s, see Susan 
Schweik, Kicked to the Curb: Ugly Law Then and Now, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. AMICUS 1,  
2–4 (2011). 
37. TOBIN SIEBERS, DISABILITY AESTHETICS 75–79 (2010); TANYA TITCHKOSKY, THE 
QUESTION OF ACCESS: DISABILITY, SPACE, MEANING 78 (2011); Ron Imrie & Marion Kumar, 
Focusing on Disability and Access in the Built Environment, 13 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 357, 358 (1998); 
Sagit Mor, With Access and Justice for All, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 611, 612–13 (2017). 
38. Mor, supra note 37, at 612–13. 
39. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FAST FACTS: STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES (2019), https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=60 [https://perma.cc/HD2Q-
9GJM]. 
40. “For all age groups, the employment-population ratio was much lower for persons with a 
disability than for those with no disability.” U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, PERSONS WITH A DISABILITY: LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS SUMMARY — 2016 (2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/disabl_06212017.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3RY-
KDDS]. 
41. JOHN R. PARKINSON, DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC SPACE: THE PHYSICAL SITES OF 
DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE 184 (2012); Peter Freund, Bodies, Disability and Spaces: The Social Model 
and Disabling Spatial Organisations, 16 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 689, 697 (2001). 
42. SAMUAL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 75 (2009). 
43. Id. at 56, 66–68; Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword—Backlash Against the  
ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21  
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3–4 (2000). 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
Final to Printer_Dorfman.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/31/20  4:09 PM 
2020] [UN]USUAL SUSPECTS 567 
the form of “positive rights.”45 Positive rights pose affirmative duties on the state 
or other entities (such as private employers or places of public accommodations).46 
They are thus foreign to the American legal tradition of only providing “negative 
rights,” which prohibit interference with private behavior (such as the right to free 
speech or to practice one’s religion).47 Therefore, the positive right to receive 
disability accommodations has been criticized by economists because of the 
preferable treatment given to disabled persons.48 Most scholars paid attention to the 
way disability accommodations are perceived in the employment context and from 
the employers’ point of view.49 This Article fills a gap in the literature by examining 
laypeople’s perceptions of accommodations in public spaces. 
I argue that the introduction of the distributive, positive rights element of 
disability accommodations into the American legal system creates an unintended 
byproduct. It makes laypeople, who are not accustomed to this type of rights regime, 
question the deservingness of those who receive “special treatment.” In laypersons’ 
minds, as many accommodations are desirable by all members of society, it is quite 
possible that people who are not in fact “deserving” would fake a disability to obtain 
these accommodations. 
The Ugly Laws can thus be thought of as one of the first manifestations of 
public fear of the disability con,50 a socio-legal phenomenon that is omnipresent 
until this day due to the perception of accommodations as special treatment.51 
Despite the formal legal move from charity to rights, people with disabilities still 
pay a price for their ability to participate in civic life: that of public suspicion 
regarding the authenticity of their impairments. People who use legally obtained 
 
45. HEYER, supra note 13, at 44–45; Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95  
CAL. L. REV. 75, 77–78, 106 (2007) (alerting to the prominence of both negative and positive rights in 
disability policies both in the domestic and international levels). Nevertheless, a few scholars have 
argued that the line between providing accommodations and traditional antidiscrimination doctrine are 
not that different after all. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 42, at 66–68; Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination 
and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 690–95 (2001); Ruth O’Brien, What a Difference Thirty 
Years—1978 to 2008—Makes in the Transformation of Disability Law, 50 TULSA L. REV. 367,  
371 (2015). 
46. HEYER, supra note 13, at 44–45. 
47. HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 40–41; Sunstein, supra note 12, at 6; Tushnet, supra 
note 13, at 1392–93. 
48. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 486–93 (1992); Sherwin Rosen, Disability Accommodation and 
the Labor Market, in DISABILITY & WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 18, 21 
(Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1991). 
49. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of 
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003); Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53  
STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000); Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 
53 DUKE L.J. 79 (2003); J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903 (2003). 
50. An even earlier manifestation of the fear of the disability con can be traced back to the 
newspaper coverage of the eligibility assessment for pensions for disabled veterans after the Civil War. 
See Peter Blanck, Civil War Pensions and Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 120 (2001). 
51. See Dorfman, supra note 18, at 1061–63. 
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rights to park in disabled parking spots or to move to the front of lines (among 
many other rights) are often viewed as faking disabilities and abusing the law.52 
The fear of abusing disability rights and privileges is fueled by the 
misunderstanding of the complex and fluid (as opposed to static) nature of disability 
that can take visible and invisible forms.53 When people talk about those with 
disabilities as a social group, things get complicated. This group is a product of a 
social movement that for political reasons took upon itself a cross-disability 
approach,54 meaning including people with all types of disabilities. This political 
move toward an inclusive disability community makes it harder to assess 
deservingness in the eyes of the public.55 It is this elusive nature that signals to 
people that disability can be relatively easily faked and that the “special privileges” 
it awards are being regularly abused. Disability scholars have pointed to a hierarchy 
of disability within this protected group. Although both people with nonvisible, or 
less apparent, disabilities are part of the protected class, they are often marginalized 
within the disability community.56 In a social movement historically led by people 
with physical or sensory disabilities, people living with chronic illnesses (such as 
arthritis, fibromyalgia, lupus, MS, heart or respiratory conditions, HIV, or diabetes) 
and life-threatening-disabling diseases (such as cancer or AIDS), and people who 
are neurodiverse individuals (who are autistic or on the autistic spectrum) or who 
have mental-psychiatric disabilities are often set aside.57 Disability philosopher 
Susan Wendell eloquently points out the multiple layers of mistrust confronted by 
people with nonvisible disabilities: 
Suspicion surrounds people with chronic illnesses—suspicion about how 
ill/disabled we really are, how or why we became ill, whether we are doing 
everything possible to get well, and how mismanaging our lives, minds, or 
souls may be contributing to our continuing illness. Suspicion comes from 
medical professionals, friends, relatives, co-workers, and, understandably, 
from other people with disabilities.58 
Data from this study, and from the previous one, show that nearly 60% of 
both visibly and invisibly disabled Americans in a representative sample indicated 
that there are situations in which they worry that others might be skeptical of their 
 
52. As shown in previous research, the fear of the disability con extends to other disability rights 
and privileges, such as learning accommodations for students, accommodations at the workplace, the 
use of service animals, and the retaining of Social Security disability benefits. See id. 
53. Sharon N. Barnartt, Disability as a Fluid State: Introduction, in DISABILITY AS A FLUID 
STATE 1, 2 (Sharon Barnartt ed., 2010). 
54. BAGENSTOS, supra note 42, at 41–45; Richard K. Scotch, Politics and Policy in the History of 
the Disability Rights Movement, 67 MILBANK Q. 380, 385 (1989). 
55. See, e.g., Susan Wendell, Unhealthy Disabled: Treating Chronic Illnesses as Disabilities, 16 
HYPATIA 17, 28 (2001). 
56. Kirstin Marie Bone, Trapped Behind the Glass: Crip Theory and Disability Identity, 32 
DISABILITY & SOC’Y 1297, 1302, 1306 (2017); Wendell, supra note 55, at 28. 
57. Ellen Jean Samuels, My Body, My Closet: Invisible Disability and the Limits of Coming-Out 
Discourse, GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 233, 244–45 (2003). 
58. Wendell, supra note 55, at 28 (citation omitted). 
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disabilities.59 Public trust in disability law is therefore a crucial, yet understudied, 
issue affecting the legitimacy and rule of law that undergirds the participation of 
people with disabilities in society. 
II. MIXED-METHODS APPROACH 
This research empirically assesses the perceptions of the disability con in two 
specific case studies: the use of disabled parking placards and the right to go to the 
front of lines at Disneyland. I use a mixed-methods approach to investigate the way 
the stereotype of the disability con plays in both contexts, combining both 
econometric analysis of survey experiments and qualitative interviews. 
The study aims to answer the following research questions and test the 
following hypotheses: 
• Does scarcity of resources (i.e., scarcity/abundance of parking spaces and 
long/short wait in line) affect the level of suspicion? The hypothesis is that 
participants who encounter scarcity of resources will be more 
suspicious of disability con compared with those who encounter a 
situation in which resources are abundant.60 
• Does visibility of disability, which signals a sense of deservingness, affect the 
level of suspicion? The hypothesis is that participants would be more 
suspicious of a person with nonvisible disabilities (whom they see as 
undeserving and may abuse the law) than of those with visible 
disabilities. 
• How does someone’s “personal relationship with disability” (having a 
disability, having a friend or close family member with disabilities, or not 
having any relationships with disability) affect the level of suspicion? The 
hypothesis is that in both contexts, people who have some 
relationship with disability (either by being disabled themselves or 
having a cordial or familial relationship with a disabled person) will 
be less suspicious than will those who have no relationship with 
disability.61 
 
59. In this study, 58% of disabled participants (148 out of 253 disabled participants) out of a 
representative sample of 1,103 Americans (SSI 2) answered positively to the question: “Are there any 
situations where you worry that others may be skeptical of your disability?” The same percentage was 
found in previous research (142 out of 246 disabled participants, in a representative sample of 1,085 
Americans). Dorfman, supra note 18, at 1079. 
60. For the claim that abundance or scarcity of resources influences judgments of deservingness 
in implementation of distributive polices, see Kristina A. Diekmann, Steven M. Samuels, Lee Ross  
& Max H. Bazerman, Self-Interest and Fairness in Problems of Resource Allocation: Allocators Versus 
Recipients, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1061, 1061 (1997) (proving that: “As self-interested 
actors in a world of limited goods and opportunities, we are motivated to promote and justify resource 
distribution that favors us and those whom we are linked by ties of kinship or group membership.”); 
Linda J. Skitka & Philip E. Tetlock, Allocating Scarce Resources: A Contingency Model of Distributive 
Justice, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 491, 493 (1992). 
61. This hypothesis stands in contrast to the finding from previous research I conducted on 
the topic, which found higher levels of suspicion by nondisabled individuals with a friendly or familial 
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• How do people with disabilities experience the stereotype of disability con? 
Unlike the other questions that are answered via quantitative tools, 
this last question will be answered using qualitative analysis of  
forty-four interviews with people living with a wide array  
of disabilities.62 
The interviews were primarily conducted with people with disabilities. A few 
were also conducted with professionals who work in federal organizations and 
Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs) across the country who are in charge of 
implementing disabled parking policies. The interview sample consisted of  
twenty-eight women and fifteen men, all between the ages of twenty-one and 
seventy-two and living independently (that is, not in an institutional setting) in the 
San Francisco Bay Area. This area holds significance, as the first Ugly Laws were 
enacted in San Francisco, and it is where, years later, the Independent Living and 
Disability Rights Movements originated.63 Although no sampling methods were 
used to ensure that this group is representative of the disability community in the 
United States or even the Bay Area, the diversity within the sample did help 
foreground a wide spectrum of voices not often heard on a topic rarely addressed 
in academia. 
I distributed my survey experiments using the services of two online panel 
companies: Social Sampling International (SSI)64 and YouGov.65 Those platforms 
produce samples considered more diverse and representative of the general  
 
relationship with a disabled person (compared to people with no relationship with disabilities). See 
Dorfman, supra note 18, at 1073, 1077–78. For a discussion on the relationships between the findings, 
see infra Part IV.B. 
62. Sixteen interviewees were living with physical disabilities (such as paraplegia), eight had 
learning disabilities (such as dyslexia, AAD/ADHD), seven had sensory disabilities (blind or deaf 
individuals), six were living with mental disabilities (such as schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, or bipolar 
depression), four were living with chronic illness or chronic pain (such as fibromyalgia, Addison’s 
disease, or adult onset asthma), two were neurodiverse (autistic or on the autistic spectrum), and one 
interviewee was living with life threatening allergies. Eleven interviewees had more than one type  
of disability. 
63. I recruited the interviewees using multiple methods. I attended two fairs organized by local 
disability services organizations and support groups, and I also recruited through personal connections. 
The interviews averaged around thirty minutes and were semi-structured; they were conducted in 
person, recorded, and later transcribed. The interviewees received $10 or $15 gift cards as a token of 
appreciation. 
64. SSI recruits participants through various online communities, social networks, and website 
ads. SSI makes efforts to recruit hard-to-reach groups, such as ethnic minorities and seniors. These 
potential participants are then screened and invited into the panel. When deploying a particular survey, 
SSI randomly selects panel participants for survey invitations. It later uses weighing of certain 
participants to create a more representative sample. I did not employ quotas but asked SSI to recruit a 
target population that matched the (18 and older) census American population on education, gender, 
age, geography, and income. 
65. YouGov interviewed 1078 participants who were then matched down to a sample of 1000 
to produce the final dataset. The participants were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, 
education, party identification, ideology, and political interest. The frame was constructed by stratified 
sampling from the full 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) sample with selection within strata by 
weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file). 
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U.S. population than those collected through online convenience samples (such as 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, MTurk). I also ran pretests for each experiment  
on MTurk. 
The experiments were included in omnibus surveys comprising questions on 
various topics investigated by Stanford University researchers from various 
departments66 and thus allowed for some flexibility in the ordering of the questions. 
I ran the experiments in three rounds. At first, each panel company distributed 
one of the survey experiments, either the Disneyland or the parking. (I refer to those 
two rounds as “SSI 1” and “YouGov.”) This method guaranteed that participants 
would not be biased when shown more than one scenario about potential abuse of 
disability rights. This also contributed to the external validity, as I ran similar 
experiments across different representative samples. I then ran the two experiments 
together (I refer to this round as “SSI 2”). Overall, the research population included 
more than 3200 participants from three representative samples of the  
U.S. population. 
The YouGov nationally representative sample included 1000 participants, 447 
men and 553 women, between the ages of eighteen and ninety-two. In terms of 
relationship with disability, 239 people self-identified as people with disabilities, and 
761 people identified as nondisabled. This percentage (almost 24% of the survey 
sample identify as people with disabilities) closely corresponds with U.S. Census 
Bureau data that show that 20% of the U.S. population is living with some kind of 
disability.67 Out of the 761 nondisabled participants, 27% (267 participants) had a 
personal relationship with a disabled individual (who was either a friend or a family 
member). Participants in this sample partook in the disabled parking experiment. 
The SSI 1 nationally representative sample included 1,172 participants,68 559 
men and 613 women, between the ages of eighteen and ninety-nine. Exactly  
20% of the sample (233 participants) identified as people with disabilities whereas 
939 identified as nondisabled. Among the nondisabled participants, 33% (391 
participants) said they had a personal relationship with a disabled individual. 
Participants in this sample partook in the Disneyland line experiment. 
 
66. None of the other questions on the survey concerned disability, abuse of rights, or any topic 
that I thought could potentially bias the results. 
67. It was found in 2010 that about 56.7 million people 
—19% of the American population—had a disability. See Nearly 1 in 5 People Have a Disability in the 
U.S., Census Bureau Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU ( July 25, 2012), https://www.census.gov/
newsroom/releases/archives/miscellaneous/cb12-134.html [https://perma.cc/W4L5-VYDN]. The 
slightly higher percentage of people with disabilities in the sample could be attributed to the fact that 
participating in online surveys is a job that suits many people living in disabilities who still find the job 
market to be inaccessible (both in terms of conditions and attitudes). 
68. Originally 1357 individuals started the survey, but after dropping participants who failed to 
complete it, the sample dropped to 1172. 
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The SSI 2 nationally representative sample was composed of 1103 
participants,69 519 men and 581 women,70 between the ages of eighteen and  
eighty-two. Twenty-three percent of the sample (253 participants) identified as 
people with disabilities whereas 830 identified as nondisabled. Out of the 
nondisabled participants, 35% (294 participants) said they had a personal 
relationship with a disabled individual.71 In this sample, disabled participants were 
asked whether there are situations in which they worry that others may be skeptical 
of their disabilities. Exactly as was demonstrated in previous research,72 58% of 
disabled participants (148 participants) answered positively to the question, 
indicating that they have experienced suspicion of the disability con themselves. 
Participants partook in both the parking and the Disneyland line experiments. 
The third round, SSI 2, included two general questions about the level of 
suspicion of the disability con and the prevalence of fakery in the eyes of the 
participants. Those questions were included in the survey before the participants 
were exposed to the two experiments (the treatment). The questions were as 
follows: In your opinion, to what extent do current disability laws allow people, who do not 
have disabilities, to take advantage of them? and In general, how often do you think people 
who are not disabled take advantage of laws that are designed for people with disabilities? 
The answers were given on a 1–5 Likert scale. 
Table 1. Research Population Across Samples 
 
 
The idea behind the inclusion of these questions was to ensure the internal 
validity of the study, in other words, to prove that the experiments are testing levels 
of suspicion of the disability con and not some other construct. A positive 
 
69. Before dropping participants who did not complete the survey, the sample included  
1175 participants. 
70. Three participants assigned themselves to a third gender option (“other”). 
71. Five participants chose not to respond to the question of whether they have a family 
member or friend living with disabilities. 
72. Dorfman, supra note 18, at 1079. 
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correlation between the answers to the general questions about suspicion and the 
question asked in the experiments proves that this is the case. Such a correlation 
was indeed found.73 
The limitations of experimental methods center on their external validity, 
meaning the degree to which results are generalizable to broader phenomena of 
interest. Experiments also reduce scenarios to a few core variables, often 
implemented over a short period, compared with the complex and “messy” nature 
of everyday life situations. This is specifically true for survey experiments that are 
limited in simulating scenarios and their consequential emotional responses. In this 
case, the experiments cannot recreate the exact feelings of frustrations, stress, and 
nervousness resulting from looking for parking or standing in line for a theme park 
attraction. To mitigate these concerns, I conducted surveys at different points in 
time, using nationally representative samples and providing vignettes that closely 
resemble real-life scenarios with the addition of familiar visual cues of either a 
disabled parking placard on a car windshield or a sign indicating wait time at 
Disneyland. I also reran my experiments a few times, as pretests on MTurk and 
three times on representative samples, to demonstrate the reliability of the results. 
I report my findings from the experiments using OLS regression models and 
two-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA). I also conducted an analysis of the data 
using ordinal regressions (ordered logit), and those yielded similar results. 
In the next parts, I present the two case studies examined in this research and 
elaborate on the experiments conducted on each one. 
III. TWO CASE STUDIES 
A. Case Study I: Disabled Parking Placards 
The right to park in a disabled parking spot (commonly known as handicapped 
parking74) might be the one most associated with disability rights. As parking is such 
a quotidian activity in the developed world,75 it is a perfect example wherein to 
illustrate the relationship between law, culture, and society both with regard to 
legality76 and to disability. Legality has been described as the concepts of “the 
meanings, sources of authority, and cultural practices that are commonly recognized 
as legal.”77 The right to park in disabled parking signals to others a person’s social 
 
73. See infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
74. As the term “handicapped” is regarded as outdated and even offensive in the disability 
community and in disability rights advocacy, I will refrain from using the term “handicapped parking,” 
although this is the term generally used in academic and legal discourse. I will instead use the term 
“disabled parking.” 
75. MARUSEK, supra note 25, at 1. 
76. Id. at 17, 23, 31. 
77. Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law, in THE COMMON PLACE OF 
LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 15, 22 (Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1998); see also 
KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF REAL 
LAW 47 (2d ed. 2016). 
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identity and is symbolic of the role that law plays in ensuring the participation of 
people with disabilities in society.78 
With regard to disabled parking fraud, I make a distinction between situations 
in which people park in disabled parking spots without a disabled parking placard79 
and those who display such a placard but whose appearance and behavior do not 
fit within the public’s view of disability. Although I consider the first category to 
be inexcusable, as it deprives people with disabilities their legal rights and can even 
be a safety issue,80 I will demonstrate how the second category is far from being 
clear-cut and how it raises core issues of legality, private enforcement, trust, and 
deservingness.81 
1. Disabled Parking Regulations 
Disabled parking regulations were first enacted in the United States through 
modest local programs at the state level, during the 1960s and 1970s, in tandem with 
the first days of the independent living and disability rights movements.82 The 
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 signaled the first time the federal government 
required any physical accessibility standards.83 However, these requirements were 
restricted to federal facilities and only where it was possible.84 The Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 extended the reach of the federal regulations beyond federal facilities 
 
78. MARUSEK, supra note 25, at 17, 62–63. 
79. For observational research that predicts some guilt on the part of those who illegally park 
in disabled parking without a placard and calls for more police enforcement, see Donna Fletcher, A 
Guilt Gradient in the Illegal Use of Parking Spaces Reserved for People with Disabilities: Field Observations 
over Five Years, 93 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 157, 161 (2001). 
80. In an interview I conducted with a representative from the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), she clearly made a connection between disabled parking, safety, and other 
stigmas regarding people with disabilities and parenthood: 
 
We tie everything to safety, and when people don’t have access to the right of accessible 
parking, then they are forced to deploy their [wheelchair] lift in the middle of roads, 
the middle of a parking lot, and that creates a safety problem . . . . It’s never safe, 
because it’s not something you [as a driver] would normally expect someone to do in 
the middle of a parking lot. And then, of course, you also have people with disabilities 
who have small children, and if you’re already limited, and you have a mobility 
impairment, children can get away from you quickly. So there’s lots of different 
scenarios you could run. I think sometimes we assume that people with disabilities 
don’t have children or aren’t married, that all of them have care attendants, I mean just 
lots of different stereotypes that exist out there. 
 
For the stereotypes about disabled parenthood, see Doron Dorfman, The Inaccessible Road to 
Motherhood—The Tragic Consequence of Not Having Reproductive Policies for Israelis with Disabilities, 
30(1) COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 49, 65–71 (2015); Robyn Powell & Michael Ashley Stein, Persons with 
Disabilities and their Sexual, Reproductive, and Parenting Rights: An International and Comparative Analysis, 11 
FRONTIERS L. CHINA 53 67 (2016). 
81. See ELLEN SAMUELS, FANTASIES OF IDENTIFICATION: DISABILITY, GENDER, RACE  
134–35 (2014). 
82. Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Handicapped Parking, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 81,  
87 (2000). 
83. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (2012). 
84. Id. 
Final to Printer_Dorfman.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/31/20  4:09 PM 
2020] [UN]USUAL SUSPECTS 575 
to federally funded ones.85 In 1988, the Fair Housing Act was amended to prohibit 
discrimination against a buyer or a renter with disabilities by requiring the 
implementation of disabled parking in housing.86 Today, at the federal level, the 
requirement to have disabled parking spaces available is an integral part of public 
accommodations according to Title II and Title III of the ADA. 
However, beyond the federal level, a complex “mosaic of rules” governs 
disabled parking at the state and local government levels.87 These rules pertain to 
the eligibility to receive a disabled parking permit and site regulations (on the design 
and number of parking spaces). 
Disabled parking permits can be temporary or permanent (yet subject to 
renewal) when the criteria for eligibility are determined by each state. The 
Department of Transportation’s Uniform System for Parking for Persons with 
Disabilities (Uniform System Regulations) serves as a baseline standard for the 
states.88 The guidelines in the Uniform System Regulations suggest that a person 
should be eligible for a permit if he or she can comply with one of six qualifying 
conditions: 
(1) Cannot walk two hundred feet without stopping to rest; or 
(2) Cannot walk without the use of, or assistance from a brace, cane, crutch, 
another person, prosthetic device, wheelchair, or other assistive device; or 
(3) Are restricted by lung disease to such an extent that the person’s forced 
(respiratory) expiratory volume for one second, when measured by 
spirometry, is less than one liter, or the arterial oxygen tension is less than 
sixty mm/hg on room air at rest; or 
(4) Use portable oxygen; or 
(5) Have a cardiac condition to the extent that the person’s functional 
limitations are classified in severity as Class III or Class IV according to 
standards set by the American Heart Association; or 
(6) Are severely limited in the ability to walk due to an arthritic, 
neurological, or orthopedic condition.89 
As mentioned, these eligibility criteria are just a minimum standard, and states 
such as Kentucky, for example, clarified and expended the eligibility to people with 
sensory disabilities, chronic illnesses, and other “debilitating condition[s] which 
limits or impairs one’s . . . mobility or ability to walk.”90 The case of Debbie Mizrahi 
 
85. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). 
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3614(a) (2012). 
87. Miller & Singer, supra note 82, at 88. 
88. CAROL TOLAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22697, FEDERAL LAW ON PARKING 
PRIVILEGES FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 1–2 (2008); ROBERT M. WARD & NIKKIA E. GRANT, 
DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, SUGGESTIONS FOR ENFORCING HANDICAP PARKING LAWS 5 (2010), 
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/organization/disabilities/Appendix_J_-Accessible_Parking 
_Studies_by_Other_States.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SKF-E88T]. 
89. Uniform System Regulations, 23 C.F.R. § 1235.2(b) (2019). 
90. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.456 (West 2018); WARD & GRANT, supra note 88, at 6. 
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from Florida exemplifies another kind of disability not covered by the Uniform 
System Regulations. Mizrahi, fifty-five, had brain cancer and, as a consequence of 
her treatment, she experiences short-term memory loss. To remember where she 
parked her car, she needs to park it in the disabled parking spot.91 
The expiration and renewal periods of “permanent” disabled placards vary 
from state to state and even from town to town but usually stand between three and 
five years. All cases require the receipt of a certificate signed by a doctor or health 
professional.92 According to the Uniform System Regulations, temporary disabled 
placards should be valid for a period determined by physicians, not to exceed six 
months.93 
2. Rationales and Privileges 
Owning a disabled parking placard establishes three entitlements: (1) the right 
to obtain a reserved spot even when parking is scarce, in other words, in crowded and 
popular venues such as malls or sporting events; (2) the right to park close to the 
entrance, an accommodation for the person who has difficulty walking long 
distances. In economic terms, the close-by parking spot is worth more to the 
disabled individual than to a nondisabled one, and the regulator has acknowledged 
that and intervened in the market on behalf of the former over the latter; (3) an 
exemption from paying for public parking meters.94 
There are multiple rationales for the third financial exemption. The first is the 
need to promote inclusion of people with disabilities in social life. Preventing 
exclusion of this population is an issue that dates back to the Ugly Laws, which 
targeted disabled beggars and prohibited those considered unsightly from moving 
around in public.95 Even today, disabled people are often excluded from most of 
social, economic, and civic life and from public spaces due to environmental and 
social barriers.96 Exempting people with disabilities from paying for parking allows 
them to easily and inexpensively travel and participate in civic and social events, as 
they might have difficulty traveling with other means due to inaccessible 
environments and inaccessible public transportation.97 Another rationale for the 
 
91. David Fleshler, Parking Lot Vigilantes Abuse Woman with ‘Invisible’ Disability, SUN 
SENTINEL ( Jan. 2, 2015, 2:38 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-disabled-tag-
20150102-story.html [https://perma.cc/PEM7-572Z]. 
92. Miller & Singer, supra note 82, at 91–92. 
93. 23 C.F.R. § 1235.5(d). 
94. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, REPORT 2016-121, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR  
VEHICLES: ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATUTORY CHANGES WILL IMPROVE ITS ABILITY TO DETECT 
AND DETER MISUSE OF DISABLED PERSON PARKING PLACARDS 12 (2017), https://bsa.ca.gov/
pdfs/reports/2016-121.pdf [https://perma.cc/FDE7-U57U]; Miller & Singer, supra note 82, at 89 
n.41. 
95.   See generally SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC (2009). 
96.   See generally Rob Kitchin, ‘Out of Place’, ‘Knowing One’s Place’: Space, Power and the 
Exclusion of Disabled People, 13 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 343 (1998). 
97.   Jonathan Andrew Williams, Meter Payment Exemption for Disabled Placard Holders As 
a Barrier to Managing Curb Parking 14 (2010) (Master’s thesis, Program in Urban and Regional Planning 
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payment exemption that relates to social barriers concerns the historical and strong 
connection between disability and poverty. As articulated by the World Bank, 
“Disabled people and their families are disproportionately poor, and poor people 
are disproportionately disabled,”98 and thus are in need of such economic benefits. 
By the late 1990s, states such as Florida and Virginia had decided to cut back on the 
payment exemption due to alleged overuse and abuse.99 However, and as I will 
discuss later, the scope of abuse of disabled parking fraud is elusive. 
3. The Disabled Parking Experiment 
What I’m saying that drives me crazy. If you go to an impacted lot, and 
you see someone who gets up, and he’s very much able to walk the 
distance. But simply because there’s no parking available, and they might 
have this placard for whatever reason. I don’t know if they have it; maybe 
it was another family member or whatever it is. I don’t know whom, but 
it’s definitely not theirs. 
This short statement by twenty-five-year-old Sharon,100 a student with 
multiple learning disabilities, sums up the premise for the survey experiment I 
conducted. The two independent variables were the potential loss of the participant 
observing the situation and the visibility of disability, which signaled the  
parking-spot user’s deservingness (along with the public view about what 
constitutes a disability). I varied the scarcity of parking (whether the parking lot is 
empty or full, meaning whether the participant needs to spend time searching for 
parking) and the visibility of the disability of a person who parked in a disabled 
parking spot and has a visible permit (whether the person drags his leg or just walks 
“normally”). The dependent variable was how likely the participant thinks the 
person described has a disability. 
In regard to scarcity of resources in disabled parking circumstances, there is 
no direct personal loss to the nondisabled individuals, as they would not be able to 
take advantage of the parking spot, even if empty. However, it has been argued that 
it is difficult for nondisabled persons to assess how the preference given to disabled 
individuals actually affects their own chances of landing a parking spot. Comparing 
the disabled parking situation to the debate over affirmative action in admission to 




98.   Armantine M. Smith, Persons with Disabilities As a Social and Economic Underclass, 12 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13, 21–23 (2002); ROBERT HOLZMANN, LYNNE SHERBURNE-BENZ  
& EMIL TESLIUC, SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT: THE WORLD BANK’S APPROACH TO SOCIAL  
PROTECTION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 14 (2003), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
SOCIALPROTECTION/Publications/20847129/SRMWBApproachtoSP.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BA4K-EHZ2]. 
99.   Miller & Singer, supra note 82, at 120. 
100. All names of interviewees in this Article are pseudonyms used to protect their anonymity. 
The names of the witnesses for Disney in the legal proceedings described are authentic and have been 
taken from public records. 
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Many of the nondisabled drivers who pass by the space while circling the 
parking lot in search of a place to park may be tempted to think that they 
would have an easier time finding a space if the space had not been 
reserved. Although eliminating the space would have only a minuscule 
effect on the average parking search for nondisabled drivers, the 
cumulative cost perceived by each passing driver is likely to exceed the true 
cost simply because people have a difficult time thinking about small 
probability events.101 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four treatments: 
• Parking lot full (high scarcity) + Seeing a man limping (visible 
disability, higher deservingness); 
• Parking lot full (high scarcity) + Seeing a man walking (nonvisible 
disability, lower deservingness); 
• Parking lot empty (low scarcity) + Seeing a man limping (visible 
disability, higher deservingness); 
• Parking lot empty (low scarcity) + Seeing a man walking (nonvisible 
disability, lower deservingness). 
The vignette presented to the participants read as the following: 
 
The idea of keeping the use of a placard constant could also demonstrate the 
level of trust that laypeople put in this formal legal signal. As mentioned, the general 
views about how widespread the abuse of disabled parking permits have led people 
to see those as not credible anymore and to a loss of trust in what used to be reliable 
formal signs.102 This issue came across in the interviews while some confessed that 
they have relatives who abuse parking permits. “My brother-in-law has a disabled 
 
101. Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 971, 
992–93 (1998). 
102. Michael Bacharach & Diego Gambetta, Trust in Signs, in 2 TRUST IN SOCIETY 148, 165 
(Karen S. Cook ed., 2001). 
You head to the nearest mall to do some shopping, and the parking lot is 
packed with vehicles/relatively empty. As you are driving through the parking lot 
to find parking, you see a young man coming out of his car, which he parked 
in the disabled parking spot. You see the young man drag one of his legs while 
walking/walking toward the mall entrance. As you pass by his car in the disabled 
parking spot, you notice he has a disabled parking permit. 
 
In your opinion, how likely is it for the man to be a person with a disability? 
• Extremely likely 
• Very likely  
• Moderately likely  
• Slightly likely  
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placard, which he uses for parking. You won’t tell on me, will you?” said Gina,  
fifty-two, who had become a wheelchair user six months before our interview due 
to an illness: “I’m not sure how he got it . . . But I know [that] when his daughter . . . 
had an operation, they were using it for her. Maybe that’s where he got it . . . . He 
uses it every now and then, and technically I don’t think he’s supposed to.” Norah 
said, “My mother-in-law tells me that my nephew, he has the placard from the mom, 
[but he uses it] even when he’s not driving the mom around.” Camila, twenty-five, 
who has multiple learning disabilities, was not as sure but was quite suspicious of 
her relative, demonstrating how the suspicion of the disability con transcends to 
disabled individuals as well: 
My cousin actually . . . I hate it when people do this, when they use the 
handicap placard. A lot of people use the handicap placard. She has a bad 
knee but . . . I just don’t think she needs it. She doesn’t need help. She 
doesn’t need to park that closely to wherever she’s at. She just wants it 
because her husband pushes her more to get it. She feels bad, but they use 
it because they just want the parking space. 
All the participants were shown the same photo. 
Figure 1: Disabled parking placard photo presented to the participants 
4. Findings 
Counterintuitively, and contrary to the hypothesis, the scarcity of resources 
(the congested parking lot) did not have a statistically significant effect on the level 
of suspicion against the man using the disabled parking. It was only the visibility of 
disability that affected the suspicion level of the participants, and as hypothesized, 
the participants were always more suspicious of the man with the less apparent 
disability (P < 0.001). The findings from the parking experiment replicated across 
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the two samples. As mentioned, I ran the experiment on two nationally 
representative samples of 1,000 participants distributed by YouGov and on a sample 
of 1,103 distributed by SSI. I then combined the two samples, as the experiment 
was performed identically in the two runs. The results reported are derived from 
the combined sample of 2,103 participants. An inspection of the separate results 
demonstrates that they are nearly identical (see the regression tables for the YouGov 
and SSI 2 in Appendix 1). 
A two-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirmed these findings. The 
effect of the scarcity of parking on the level of suspicion was not statistically 
significant whereas the visibility of disability was highly significant (F(1, 2,102)  
= 442.6, p < 0.001). The effect size of the visibility within the variance is d = 0.92, 
which according to Cohen’s d conventions is an extremely large effect.103 The 
interaction effect between scarcity and visibility was not statistically significant.104 
The general level of suspicion by participants was lower than hypothesized, 
such that the mean levels of suspicion were 2.29 for the combined samples. 
 
Figure 2. Level of Suspicion in the Parking Experiment by Visibility of Disability 





103. According to the Cohen’s convention, d = 0.2 is considered a “small” effect size, 0.5 
represents a “medium” effect size, and 0.8 a “large” effect size. See JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL 
POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 24–27 (2d ed. 1988). 
104. The results were similar across each one of the other waves. The ANOVA and Cohen’s d 
results for the YouGov sample, were (F(1, 999) = 231.4, p < 0.001), d = 0.96; The ANOVA and 
Cohen’s d results for the SSI 2 sample were (F(1, 1102) = 229.3, p < 0.001), d = 0.89. 
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Table 2. OLS Regression of Level of Suspicion in Parking Experiment  
(combined data from YouGov and SSI 2) 
Notes: Other control variables that were not found significant are race, family income, and age. 
General suspicion level of others; Level of suspicion measured on a scale of 1–5. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
B. Case Study II: Skipping Lines 
With my illustration of how disability laws and policies play out in action, my 
choice of Disney theme parks might seem surprising at first glance. However, 
Disney parks can serve as an excellent way to showcase the pubic suspicion of the 
disability con and its relationship to American culture because Disney parks have 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
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Constant 2.811*** 2.899*** 2.975*** 3.083*** 
 
2.551*** 
R-square  0.1767 0.1877 0.1910 0.2000 0.2172 
Adjusted R-square 0.1755 0.1854 0.1882 0.1970 0.2093 
Sample Size (N) 2,175 2,102 2,098 2,098 2,095 
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been thought of as a microcosmic laboratory of American life and values.105 
Furthermore, Disney theme parks have been known to influence other spheres in 
“real” American everyday life (such as cities, shopping malls, museums). Queuing, 
an integral part of visiting a Disney park, is a private ordering mechanism for 
ensuring (perceived and actual) fairness and also extends important lessons to other 
myriad areas of life. Therefore, studying how fear of the disability con manifests 
itself in Disneyland would be helpful in understanding the phenomenon in other 
“Disney-influenced spaces.”106 Using Disneyland as an example works from the 
outside-in (Disney parks’ representing American society) and from the inside-out 
(other spaces are mimicking Disneyland). Disney parks “become[ ] a useful lens 
through which to view a number of issues that are of concern in contemporary 
social sciences.”107 
1. Lines and the “Disney Laws” 
Visiting a Disney park is an immersive experience primarily because it is an 
extremely controlled environment.108 Many scholars have discussed oversight of 
guests in the park109 through architectural design,110 structural methods (such as the 
high cost of admission and displayed signage),111 and strictly enforced rules about 
appropriate behavior and attire.112 
 Despite that law and order are omnipresent at Disney parks, people come there 
to relieve anxieties, forget their worries, and enjoy an uplifting, enjoyable 
experience.113 Statistics show that 70% of Disney World guests are repeat visitors.114 
Ironically, however, a visit to a Disney park can also be seen as an uneasy experience 
due to its competitive nature—competition with other guests for the most precious 
 
105. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION 12 (Sheila Faria Glaser  
trans., Univ. of Mich. 1994) (1981); Margaret J. King & J.G. O’Boyle, The Theme Park: The Art of Time 
and Space, in DISNEYLAND AND CULTURE: ESSAYS ON THE PARKS AND THEIR INFLUENCE 5, 8 
(Kathy Merlock Jackson & Mark I. West eds., 2011). 
106. Bryman has referred to the representative aspect of the Disney parks as structural 
Disneyization and to the influential aspect as transferred Disneyization. See ALAN BRYMAN, THE 
DISNEYIZATION OF SOCIETY 12 (2004). 
107. Id. at 175. 
108. CHER KRAUSE KNIGHT, POWER AND PARADISE IN WALT DISNEY’S WORLD 26–32 (2014). 
109. One of the early and most extreme views was articulated by Italian philosopher Umberto 
Eco who wrote, “Disneyland is also a place of total passivity. Its visitors must agree to behave like 
robots.” UMBERTO ECO, TRAVELS IN HYPER REALITY: ESSAYS 48 (William Weaver trans., Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1986) (1967). 
110. STEPHEN M. FJELLMAN, VINYL LEAVES: WALT DISNEY WORLD AND AMERICA 203 
(1992); Susan Willis, Public Use/Private State, in INSIDE THE MOUSE: WORK AND PLAY AT DISNEY 
WORLD 180, 184–85 (The Project on Disney ed., 1995). 
111. Guests are expected to “show common courtesy to fellow park guests” and avoid engaging 
in unsafe, illegal, or offensive behaviors. See KNIGHT, supra note 108, at 63. 
112. BRYMAN, supra note 106, at 132–33. Guests are expected to “show common courtesy to 
fellow park guests” and avoid engaging in unsafe, illegal, or offensive behaviors. See KNIGHT, supra note 
108, at 63. 
113. KNIGHT, supra note 108, at 26. 
114. Id. 
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resource there is: time. As cultural studies scholars Margaret King and Jamie 
O’Boyle write: “Like our cities, theme parks are crowded, competitive,  
decision-laden environments requiring considerable pre-planning and re-planning 
as contingencies, chance, and fresh opportunities arise . . . . A theme park visit, 
unlike a beach or spa vacation, demands almost continuous decision-making and 
problem-solving.”115 
Lines to attractions are the quintessential manifestation of the competitive 
nature that a Disney park visit could take. Lines are a system of ordering in 
conditions of scarcity.116 However, apart from enforcing social order and increasing 
efficiency, lines also promote equality because they rely on the principle that 
individuals should access services based on their time of arrival at the service 
location.117 “First come, first served” is an important concept in American society, 
as it reinforces the democratic notions of fairness, efficiency, and equality.118 One 
should always wait his or her turn, as everyone is supposed to be equal in access to 
systems of distribution.119 
The tension between the social reasoning to have lines (as a matter of 
enforcing order) and the individualistic desire to be entitled and to “jump the queue” 
is the force behind the fear of the disability con in Disney parks.120 Simply put, 
“[lines] tell us what excuses are acceptable and how to make or avoid eye contact 
with others. Lines are arenas for both civility and potential chaos. They are also the 
one central experience all visitors [to Disney parks] share,” and disability is the 
celebrity status that could potentially cut all the others but not without evoking 
strong emotions of anger and envy.121 
 
115. King & O’Boyle, supra note 105, at 15; see also Susan Willis, The Family Vacation, in INSIDE 
THE MOUSE: WORK AND PLAY AT DISNEY WORLD, supra note 110, at 34, 35–37. 
116. Young, supra note 3, at 76. 
117. Id. at 78–79. 
118. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS  
18–19 (2012); Richard C. Larson, Perspectives on Queues: Social Justice and the Psychology of Queueing, 35 
OPERATIONS RES. 895, 896 (1987); Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, Queues in Law, 99 IOWA  
L. REV. 1595, 1602 (2014). 
119. FJELLMAN, supra note 110, at 205; SANDEL, supra note 118, at 39. 
120. The metaphor of “queue jumpers” has been discussed in legal scholarship to describe 
various instances from academic accommodations for learning disabilities, to healthcare coverage, 
claiming refugee status, and housing rights. See generally MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING 
THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING 
DISABILITIES (1997); Young, supra note 3, at 93–112. In her account of the events that led to the 
Presidential election results of 2016, renowned sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild describes how 
Trump voters perceive themselves as standing in a line working towards accomplishing the American 
Dream when minorities, women, immigrants, refugees, public sector workers are “cutting in line ahead 
of them,” because of liberal policies such as affirmative action. “You feel uneasy. It has been said: the 
line cutters irritate you. They are violating rules of fairness.” ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, 
STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT  
102–04 (2016). 
121. FJELLMAN, supra note 110, at 206; Ben Mattlin, When Wheelchairs Are Cool, N.Y. TIMES 
( July 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/01/opinion/when-wheelchairs-are-cool.html?_r 
=0 [https://perma.cc/HK76-C35S ]. 
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2. Disability Policy in Disney Parks 
“In general, and contrary to much of the real world, the disabled are made 
welcome [in Disney parks]”122 through careful design of the built environment and 
policies that include reserved seating and access procedures to shows, parades, and 
rides, all which ensure accessibility. Those efforts were put in place even before it 
was mandatory under Title III to the ADA.123 In the words of the mother of a  
4.5-year-old girl with cerebral palsy and epilepsy writing about the experience of 
holding annual passes to Disneyland: 
It has been one of the most magical and incredible family fun times of our 
lives . . . There’s just no way to describe seeing your child have genuine 
fun . . . their face light up . . . and feel like just one of the kids . . . when you 
so often watch them on the sidelines . . . watching everyone else ride bikes 
and play baseball in the cul de sac. Disneyland is one of the absolute few 
places where we can all . . . every one of us . . . participate in the same way. 
She concludes: 
Disneyland is not a basic human right, but it’s FUN. And in so many ways, 
it actually manages to level the playing field, if even only for a day.124 
Disability is ubiquitous in Disney parks because these places are so welcoming 
and accessible.125 People can rent wheelchairs and other assistive devices at City 
Hall at the entrance to the park. 
In the past, Disney parks had a policy of issuing a Guest Assistant Card (GAC), 
which allowed guests with disabilities and all people in their respective parties to 
skip lines and enter attractions through alternative entrances.126 The rationale for 
allowing people with disabilities to skip lines has to do with the fact that, generally 
speaking, this population tends to move more slowly than nondisabled persons do. 
To “compensate” for the lost time of moving around the spread-out theme park 
and to allow disabled guests to enjoy the many attractions, Disney accommodates 
them by providing them with shorter lines. Other rationales for the policy differ 
according to the type of disability. People with mobility or orthopedic impairments 
who use wheelchairs, scooters, or strollers also cannot physically wait in the lines 
that were designed as complex open mazes127 and are not wide enough to 
accommodate mobility devices.128 For people with neurological impairments (or 
 
122. FJELLMAN, supra note 110, at 201. 
123. Id. 
124. Jeannett Gibson, Disneyland’s Guest Access Card Changes & Physical Disabilities, LIFE 
REARRANGED (Sept. 26, 2013), http://liferearranged.com/2013/09/disneylands-guest-access-pass-
changes-physical-disabilities/ [https://perma.cc/4QMF-YDJC]. 
125. St. Clair, supra note 20. 
126. A.L. v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., No. 6:14-cv-1544-Orl-22GJK, at *1–2 
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2016) (Courthouse News Service). 
127. FJELLMAN, supra note 110, at 207. Umberto Eco wrote: “Access to each attraction is 
regulated by a maze of metal railings which discourages any individual initiative [to choose and think 
independently].” ECO, supra note 109, at 48. 
128. Gibson, supra note 124. 
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simply differences, as the neurodiversity movement puts it129), such as autism, 
waiting in line is an excruciating task, as will be discussed later. 
The perception of the GAC policy as providing “special rights” was further 
emphasized by media outlets that refer to it as the “line jumping program.”130 
Because of the privileges it allows, there was alleged abuse of the GAC system, when 
“the most common way guests abused the former GAC system was by requesting 
the accommodation with no need for it altogether.”131 Another type of abuse 
received major national attention in May 2013, when multiple media outlets 
published stories about wealthy families hiring individuals with disabilities as “tour 
guides” to take advantage of their “celebrity” status and cut the lines with them.132 
Due to this type of abuse, Disney changed its GAC policy beginning October 
2013.133 The new policy, replacing GAC, is called Disability Access Services (DAS) 
and requires guests with disabilities and their parties to obtain a special card at the 
park’s entrance. This card allows disabled guests to “virtually wait” for attractions 
without waiting in line by receiving a ticket with a “return time” for every attraction 
after visiting a special kiosk located next to it.134 These guests can thus plan their 
visit accordingly (by visiting attractions in the order of the wait times obtained  
for each one).135 
 
129. See, e.g., ANNE MCGUIRE, WAR ON AUTISM: ON THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF NORMATIVE 
VIOLENCE 59 (2016); Francisco Ortega, The Cerebral Subject and the Challenge of Neurodiversity, 4 
BIOSOCIETIES 425, 426 (2009); Judy Singer, ‘Why Can’t You Be Normal for Once in Your Life?’ From 
a ‘Problem with No Name’ to the Emergence of a New Category of Difference, in DISABILITY DISCOURSE 
62, 64 (Mairian Corker & Sally French, eds., 1999). 
130. Disney Changing Line-Jumping Program for Disabled, FOX NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013), http://
www.foxnews.com/travel/2013/09/24/disney-changing-line-jumping-program-for-disabled.html 
[https://perma.cc/7HT8-ZLR7]. 
131. A.L. v. Disney, No. 6:14-cv-1544-Orl-22GJK, at *2–3; see also Ciara Lavelle, How I Scammed 
the Disney World Wheelchair Line System, MIAMI NEW TIMES (May 15, 2013), https://
www.miaminewtimes.com/arts/how-i-scammed-the-disney-world-wheelchair-line-system-6492140 
[https://perma.cc/D2CT-LP96]. 
132. KNIGHT, supra note 108, at 160; Lavelle, supra note 131; Lisa Belkin, Disney World  
Scam: Wealthy Moms ‘Rent’ Disabled Guides to Skip the Lines (And Shame Humankind),  
HUFFINGTON POST (May 14, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/14/skipping-lines-
at-disney_n_3275836.html [https://perma.cc/AU62-PUKW]; Moms Pay $1,000-a-Day to Hire 
Disabled Members to Skip Lines at Disney, FOX NEWS (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/
travel/2013/05/14/wealthy-nyc-moms-pay-1000-day-for-disabled-tour-members-to-skip-lines-at-
disney.html [https://perma.cc/63LF-6WVU]; Tara Palmeri, Rich Manhattan Moms Hire Handicapped 
Tour Guides So Kids Can Cut Lines at Disney World, N.Y. POST (May 14, 2013), https://nypost.com/
2013/05/14/rich-manhattan-moms-hire-handicapped-tour-guides-so-kids-can-cut-lines-at-disney-
world/[https://perma.cc/XB28-96YD]; Jeff Rossen & Josh Davis, Undercover at Disney: ’Deplorable’
 Scheme to Skip Lines, TODAY (May 31, 2013), https://www.today.com/news/undercover-disney-
deplorable-scheme-skip-lines-6C10131266 [https://perma.cc/EJ4K-T3G4]. 
133. Rossen & Davis, supra note 132. 
134. A.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc., 900 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th  
Cir. 2018). 
135. Id. For the official policy, see Disney Parks, Disney Parks Disability Access Service Card Fact 
Sheet, DISNEY PARKS BLOG, https://disneyparks.disney.go.com/blog/disney-parks-disability-access-
service-card-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/X83C-GJZG] (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). The difference 
between a DAS card and a regular “Fast Pass,” which is available to every guest in the park, is that the 
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The change of policy due to fear of the disability con had caused quite a stir 
within the disability community, many of whom visit the parks regularly throughout 
their lives and view the former GAC policy as the one that best accommodates their 
needs.136 Some guests with disabilities even turned to the courts for help. 
In April 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida in 
Orlando rendered its decision in a case filed by A.L., a frequent visitor to Disney 
World, who has moderate-to-severe autism. A.L.’s impairment could make his visit 
to the park challenging because, as mentioned, it could be a competitive experience 
that requires continual decision-making and is prone to changes according to 
chance.137 A.L. is “incapable of deviating from consistency and routine”; his 
impairment requires him to follow his set plan when visiting the park. Following a 
routine includes avoiding waiting in line for attractions. Deviating from the routine 
results in a meltdown.138 
Although A.L. was extremely pleased with the GAC, when he tried to visit the 
park with his family and used the new DAS system, he found it to be insufficient in 
maintaining the much-needed strict routine. He had to cut his visit short and leave, 
to avoid the risk of a meltdown, after standing in line for forty minutes for one 
attraction.139 A.L. claimed that the failure of the DAS to accommodate his needs is 
illegal based on Title III of the ADA, which prohibits disability discrimination “in 
the full and equal enjoyment of . . . services” at “any place of public 
accommodation” such as theme parks.140 The “full and equal enjoyment” standard 
can be fulfilled via the use of “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures.”141 
A.L. thus filed for injunctive relief, requiring Disney to return to the GAC 
system because he alleges it is the only one that accommodates persons with 
cognitive-neurological impairments.142 In response, Disney again relied on the fear 
of the disability con rationale by claiming that returning to the GAC system would 
“fundamentally alter its operations based on the risk of abuse and an overall adverse 
 
former applies only to popular attractions, whereas the latter applies to every attraction. Despite the 
fact that the DAS can only hold one “return time” at a time, one can use it in addition to the Fast Pass 
that allows for reserved times to three attractions a day. See A.L. ex rel. D.L., 900 F.3d at 1277. 
136. A.L. v. Disney, No. 6:14-cv-1544-Orl-22GJK, at *2; Katia Hetter, Disney Tightens up Resort 
Disability Program, CNN (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/travel/article/disney-disability-policy-
changes/index.html [https://perma.cc/34F8-7SRN]. 
137. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
138. “A meltdown consists of exhibiting a specific tic or tendency which could be humming 
sounds, making random noises, striking out, swinging arms, hitting oneself, or flailing wildly.”  
A.L. v. Disney, No. 6:14-cv-1544-Orl-22GJK, at *2. 
139. Id. at *3–4. 
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1990); A.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc., 
900 F.3d 1270, 1290 (11th Cir. 2018) (“As a threshold issue, plaintiffs claim Disney’s DAS program is 
an impermissible ‘blanket’ or ‘one size fits all’ policy for all disabled persons with autism and/or 
cognitive impairments.”). 
141. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1990). 
142.  A.L. v. Disney, No. 6:14-cv-1544-Orl-22GJK, at *4. 
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impact on the wait times experienced by all other guests.”143 In other words, 
Disney’s perceptions of the adverse effect of the abuse of its disability policy are 
sufficient justification for enacting a new policy that is far less favorable to  
its beneficiaries. 
The district court eventually dismissed all of A.L.’s claims and granted 
summary judgement for Disney. In its decision, the court explained that even with 
the DAC system in place, Disney “affords Plaintiff a similar, or better, experience 
as those not needing [it].”144 After winning summary judgement in the A.L. case, 
Disney filed for summary judgments in thirty-seven other similar cases brought by 
disabled individuals145 against the DAS, which were granted in September 2016.146 
A.L. and the thirty-six other plaintiffs filed appeals to the Eleventh Circuit that  
were consolidated.147 
On August 17, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the summary judgements 
after finding that genuine issues of material facts exist with regard to the question 
about the necessity of the modification in the form of an altered DAS.148 The court 
concluded, “The DAS card, as good as it may be, still fails to address plaintiffs’ 
alleged impairments of the inability to wait virtually for rides and the need to adhere 
to a routine order of rides or repeat rides.”149 The Eleventh Circuit remanded the 
case back to the district court to examine whether amending the DAS system to 
properly meet the needs of the plaintiffs-appellants would be reasonable (i.e., 
making sure that the amendment will not “fundamentally alter the nature of” 
services and facilities offered in the parks,150 as Disney claimed it would by allowing 
for as much fraud as allegedly existed in the days of the GAC system.151) 
3. The Disneyland Line Experiment 
I designed an experiment around the experience of disability in a Disneyland 
line. Disney parks are an example of a place where line length matters, but a similar 
experience is typical in other cultural institutions (such as theaters and museums), 
airports, or government offices.152 I varied the wait time and the visibility of 
disability of a guest who proceeds to the front of the line. 
 
143. Id. at *8; A.L. ex rel. D.L., 900 F.3d at 1298–99. 
144. A.L. v. Disney, No. 6:14-cv-1544-Orl-22GJK, at *11. 
145. All but four of the thirty-six plaintiffs-appellants in those cases had autism and some of 
them had other disabilities as well. See A.L. ex rel. D.L., 900 F.3d at 1279. They were all frequent visitors 
to the parks. See id. at 1282. 
146. Id. at 1288. 
147. Id. at 1289. 
148. Id. at 1297–98. 
149. Id. at 1298. 
150. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 682 (2001). 
151.  A.L. ex rel. D.L., 900 F.3d at 1300. 
152. See SANDEL, supra note 118, at 4–17. 
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With regard to the visibility of disability, I decided to describe a wheelchair 
user because of the attention drawn to people who allegedly rent out wheelchairs at 
the park without actually being disabled. 
Taking advantage of the fact that Disney parks display the wait time on signs 
that are located at the entrance to the line,153 I manipulated a photo of a real 
Disneyland sign to showcase varying wait times. Having a visual cue helps better 
communicate the experience to participants by making it seem more real, even 
though the experiment was conducted online. 
I ran the experiments three times: once on a sample of 666 participants using 
MTurk, displaying wait times of either 120 minutes or 10 minutes;154 second on a 
representative sample of 1172 participants distributed by SSI, for which the wait 
time was either 5 minutes or no wait at all (0 minutes); and for the third time on a 
representative sample of 1103 participants distributed by SSI, for which the wait 
time was either 60 minutes or 3 minutes. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four treatments: 
• Long wait time (high scarcity) + Encountering a wheelchair user 
(visible disability, higher deservingness); 
• Long wait time (high scarcity) + Encountering a man walking 
(nonvisible disability, lower deservingness); 
• Short or no wait time (low scarcity) + Encountering a wheelchair user 
(visible disability, higher deservingness); 
• Short or no wait time (low scarcity) + Encountering a man walking 
(nonvisible disability, lower deservingness). 
  
 
153. The use of signs, which provide information to guests and help them plan their visit to 
theme parks, has been acknowledged as good practice in terms of customer experience. See Larson, 
supra note 118, at 900. 
154. This run did not include any other demographic and control variable, so, therefore, no 
regression table is provided. 
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The vignette presented to the participants read as the following: 
 
  
You go on vacation at Disneyland. While exploring the rides and 
attractions, you notice that some of them have a separate and much 
shorter line designed for people with disabilities. You decide to go on 
one of these rides and notice the sign in front of the line saying the wait 
will take 120 minutes / 60 minutes / 5 minutes / 10 minutes / 3 minutes / 
there is no wait time. You then look to your side and see a young man in a 
wheelchair go to the disabled line/walk up to the disabled line showing a card 
to the staff person. He is let in right away. 
 
In your opinion, how likely is it for the man to be a person with a 
disability? 
• Extremely likely 
• Very likely  
• Moderately likely  
• Slightly likely  
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Figure 3. Disneyland signage indicating the amount of wait time in line for an 
attraction, as presented to participants in three waves: 120 minutes vs. 10 minutes 
of wait time; 60 minutes vs. 3 minutes wait time; 5 minutes vs. no wait time at all 
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4. Findings 
The findings from the Disneyland experiments demonstrated the same 
pattern as the parking experiment did. Again, contrary to the hypothesis, the scarcity 
of resources did not have a statistically significant effect on the level of suspicion 
against the man cutting the line at Disneyland. It was solely the visibility of disability 
(that signals perceived deservingness) that affected the suspicion level of the 
participants, and as hypothesized, the participants were always more suspicious of 
the man with the less apparent disability (P < 0.001). 
The effect of the wait time on level of suspicion was not significant whereas 
the visibility of disability was again highly significant (F(1, 427) = 114.09, p < 0.001 
for the 120-min vs. 10-min wait; F(1, 1,102) = 180.61, p < 0.001 for the 3-min  
vs. 60-min wait; F(1, 1,170) = 90.14, p < 0.001 for the 5-min wait vs. no wait time. 
In the 120-min vs. 10-min wait condition, the effect size of the visibility is d 
= 0.8, which according to the Cohen’s d convention is a large effect. In the 60-min 
vs. 3-min wait condition, the effect size was also large, d = 0.81. In the 5-min vs. no 
wait condition, the effect size of the visibility was d = 0.55, which is between 
medium and large effect size. The interaction effect between wait time and visibility 
was not statistically significant. 
As with the parking experiment, the level of suspicion was lower than 
expected, with a mean of 2.36, 2.25, and 2.15 for the 120/10-min wait, 3/60-minute 
wait, 0/5-min wait, respectively. 
 
Figure 4: Level of Suspicion in a Disneyland Line by Visibility of Disability  
and Wait Time (120 minutes vs. 10 minutes) (MTurk) 
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Figure 5. Level of Suspicion in a Disneyland Line by Visibility of Disability  




Figure 6. Level of Suspicion in a Disneyland Line by Visibility of Disability  
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Table 3. OLS Regression of Level of Suspicion in a Disneyland line,  
60-Minute Wait vs. 3-Minute Wait (SSI 2) 
Notes: Other control variables that were not found significant are race, family income, and age. 
General suspicion level of others. Level of suspicion measured on a scale of 1–5. 
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Table 4. OLS Regression of Level of Suspicion in a Disneyland line,  
5-Minute Wait vs. No Wait (SSI 1) 
Notes: Other control variables that were not found significant are race, family income, gender, 
and age. Level of suspicion measured on a scale of 1–5. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed test) 
IV. DISCUSSION 
In this Part, I discuss the findings from the experiments and from the interview 
data to illuminate how fear of the disability con affects disability law in action.155 
This Part has two goals. The first is to explore the implications of the main finding 
of the experiments that the suspicion is prompted by perceptions of deservingness 
and not by the pursuit of self-interest in circumstances of scarcity. This finding 
constitutes the psychological mechanism of the fear of the disability con. The second 
goal is to demonstrate how the suspicion has a negative effect on the way people 
with disabilities negotiate their rights. 
 
155. Research on the gap between the “law on the books” and the “law in action” has been one 
of the main endeavors of the law and society movement. See STEWART MACAULAY, LAWRENCE  
M. FRIEDMAN & ELIZABETH MERTZ, LAW IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER 14–15 (2007). 
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I start by relating the psychological mechanism of the disability con to theories 
on the design of distributive laws. Next, to provide a fuller picture of the factors 
that contribute to the fear of the disability con, I highlight salient demographic 
characteristics that influenced the level of suspicion in experimental participants. I 
then use qualitative data obtained through interviews to show how the suspicion of 
the disability con creates significant burdens for disabled people when using and 
claiming rights. This Part concludes with a short description of data I obtained on 
the objective level of abuse of parking placards and the disability policy at  
Disney parks. 
A. The Psychological Mechanism of the Fear of the Disability Con 
The findings from the two experiments demonstrated that participants’ 
assessments of the situations presented to these participants in both the parking and 
the Disneyland line vignettes were not motivated by the personal cost the 
participants might incur due to the scarcity of the resources. In other words, 
participants were willing to make the sacrifice to allow for disability 
accommodations. These findings align well with observations from earlier research. 
Early research on cognitive biases and “causes of behavior” found that people 
tend to underestimate the impact of situational factors (in this case, the availability 
of parking and the wait time) and overestimate the impact of traits they see as stable 
or dispositional (in this case, the disability) when analyzing and predicting a 
stranger’s behavior.156 
Previous experimental research on public perceptions of systems designed for 
allocation of scarce resources has demonstrated that individuals see procedures that 
use a “weaker first” mechanism—one that categorizes need based on status or 
identity—as the fairest system.157 Those systems are viewed as fairer than “first 
come, first served” systems such as queuing or the allocation of public parking.158 
This is despite the fact that the “first come, first served” systems are effective in 
preventing favoritism and promoting transparency by setting clear expectations for 
participants about equally respecting everyone’s time.159 Other research has also 
demonstrated that people are willing to make small sacrifices to increase the social 
welfare and the payoff of others who are less well off,160 as long as those 
 
156. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1204–05 (1995). 
157. David A. Savage & Benno Torgler, Perceptions of Fairness and Allocations Systems, 40  
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 229, 242 (2010). It is important to note that research was conducted with 
economics students at the University of Basel in Switzerland. I was not able to locate similar research 
on a “weaker-first” mechanism conducted in an American context. 
158. Id.  
159. JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF 
RATIONALITY 70–71 (1989); Perry & Zarsky, supra note 118, at 1608, 1611; Young, supra note 3, at 75. 
160. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, 117  
Q.J. ECON. 817, 819, 849 (2002); see also Perry & Zarsky, supra note 118, at 1646–49 (discussing the 
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beneficiaries played fairly.161 Specifically, it was shown that laypeople would be 
willing to give up their places in line, even without any compensation, to strangers 
for whom it would be more efficient.162 However, giving up a place in line is not 
viewed as an ordinary incident. It should be an exception and be done selectively.163 
Disability, as an identity category, has been shown to be perceived as deserving 
to enjoy a “weaker-first” status.164 This general public view fits with the ADA’s 
accommodation mandate. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the reason for the ubiquitous private 
enforcement of disabled parking regulations, even in contexts in which the 
enforcers have little to personally gain, is the internalization of the rules by 
laypeople; they highly value the principle of “weaker first” and thus feel the need to 
enforce it.165 The same applies to the convention of queuing; in a classic experiment, 
renowned social psychologist Stanley Milgram and others explained that people do 
not violate the norms of the queue, because they have internalized them or because 
other people in the line enforce those norms through verbal and nonverbal acts.166 
As I will demonstrate later, although this private enforcement of norms might be 
well-intentioned, it ends up hurting many of the persons who are supposed to be 
protected by the law. This is due to false identification and the misunderstanding 
of the nature of disability.167 
It seems that participants needed to make sure that the legal beneficiary of the 
right was worthy of the right, in other words, receiving the preferable parking spot 
or moving to the front of the line. When there was a doubt as to the person’s 
deservingness, signaled by a nonvisible disability, participants were significantly 
more suspicious of the person’s being a “cheater”168 who is “gaming the system.” 
It is the sense of fairness, of making sure that no one is acting wrongly or 
taking advantage of the situation, rather than a simple cost-benefit analysis, that 
drives participants’ reactions to disability rights in public.169 
 
implications of what the authors call the “special need” rule on legitimacy, efficiency, and  
sense of fairness). 
161. Charness & Rabin, supra note 160, at 824–25. 
162. Felix Oberholzer-Gee, A Market for Time: Fairness and Efficiency in Waiting Lines, 59 KYKLOS 
427, 436–37 (2006). 
163. Id. at 438. 
164. It was found that, in industrialized Western countries, the general public was most in favor 
of social protection of old people, closely followed by people with disabilities. See Oorschot & Roosma, 
supra note 22, at 14–15. 
165. Geoffrey P. Miller, Norm Enforcement in the Public Sphere: The Case of Handicapped 
Parking, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 895, 908 (2003). 
166. Stanley Milgram, Hilary James Liberty, Raymond Toledo & Joyce Wackenhut, Response to 
Intrusion Into Waiting Lines, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 683, 683–85 (1986); see also Young, 
supra note 3, at 76, 82. 
167. See infra Section IV.C.1. 
168. Cosmides, supra note 7, at 197; Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 8, at 199–200. 
169. A 2019 survey conducted by a British NGO dedicated to Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis, 
and other forms of inflammatory bowel disease, strengthened this finding. It found that ninety-three 
percent of respondents think that by challenging a person who does not look disabled for using the 
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This conclusion is supported by the fact that there was a statistically significant 
positive correlation between the level of suspicion, perceptions of the prevalence of 
disability con in society, and perceptions about the ability to commit disability con 
using current legislation. Participants who thought that current disability laws are 
likely to allow people who do not have disabilities to take advantage of the law, or 
that people who are not disabled often take advantage of laws that are designed for 
people with disabilities, also demonstrated a higher level of suspicion in both 
experiments [see Tables 3 and 7 (SSI 2)].170 
The assessment of deservingness has not been measured in behavioral 
economics research on social preferences.171 This research thus fills a gap in the 
literature. In this study, the level of the visibility of disability is used as a proxy to 
measure deservingness. The topic of the socio-legal treatment of nonvisible 
disability also stands in and of itself as a worthy topic of future investigation. 
Another point that deserves further attention is the role of the market in 
establishing a sense of deservingness vis-à-vis deserving identity groups such as 
people with disabilities. In today’s economy, people can purchase their place at the 
front of the line in a variety of contexts from tourist attractions, to airports and 
highways, or even in health care with “concierge doctors” available 24/7 for an 
appointment.172 Yet it seems that much less public outcry exists about line-cutting 
by those who are willing to pay. Future research should examine the differences in 
perceived fairness in situations in which preferred treatment is assigned by the 
market or by the law. Such research would demonstrate how antidiscrimination law 
and affirmative action mandates are at play against the backdrop of a market 
economy emphasizing a “you get what you pay for” attitude.173 
 
accessible toilet, they are “standing up for the rights of disabled people” or because they believe it is 
“not fair” on the rest of society. See Katie O’Malley, 90% of People Think They’re Helping Society by 
Challenging People Who Don’t ’Look Disabled’, Says Study, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 16, 2019), https://
www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/hidden-disabilities-crohns-colitis-abuse-
disabled-toilets-a8871111.html?fbclid=IwAR0BlgT4MtM6q78YniJf9vKSyDKo3fMFLLTcOsZ5V-
zl0c9gANd-5eM70e0 [https://perma.cc/HN2K-2JKF]; see also Diekmann et al., supra note 60, at 1071 
(finding that participants in two experiments valued equal allocation of scarce resources to different 
members of society. However, participants viewed allocation favoring them or their own group 
members, who they see as deserving, as more fair compared with similar allocation disfavoring members 
of the out-group, whom they viewed as less or not deserving.). 
170. Participants were asked the questions about the prevalence of disability con before they 
were exposed to both the parking and Disneyland line experiments in the third run. The first question 
was phrased: “In your opinion, to what extent do current disability laws allow people, who do not have 
disabilities, to take advantage of them?” The answers were given on a 1–5 Likert scale: 1) To a very 
great extent; 2) To a great extent; 3) To a moderate extent; 4) To a small extent; 5) Does not allow for 
taking advantage at all. The second question was: “In general, how often do you think people who are 
not disabled take advantage of laws that are designed for people with disabilities?” The possible answers 
were: 1) Very often; 2) Often; 3) Sometimes; 4) Rarely; 5) Never. 
171. Charness & Rabin, supra note 160, at 849. 
172. See SANDEL, supra note 118, at 19–21, 25–27. 
173. Id. at 28. 
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B. Social Demographics Influencing Suspicion 
Other factors, apart from the sense of deservingness, were found to influence 
fear of the disability con. To provide a fuller picture of the regression models I used 
for the experiments, I describe the social demographics that were found to affect 
the level of suspicion. 
The OLS regression analysis of both experiments demonstrates a statistically 
significant relationship between having some kind of familiarity with disability 
(living with a disability or having a relationship with a disabled friend or family 
member) and lower levels of suspicion.174 Thus, compared with those with no 
relationship to disability, nondisabled participants who have a disabled friend or 
family member and participants with disabilities reported lower levels of suspicion 
(p < 0.05; p < 0.01, respectively).175 
With regard to other demographics, the parking experiment and one of the 
Disneyland Line experiments (SSI 2) showed a statistically significant positive 
relationship between conservative political ideology and level of suspicion  
(p < 0.001 for parking; p < 0.01 for Disneyland). The parking experiment also 
showed that having some college education is associated with a lower level of 
suspicion (p < 0.001) and that women are statistically significantly less suspicious 
than men are (p < 0.05). However, these last two demographic correlations of 
suspicion were not found in any of the Disneyland experiments. The reason for the 
inconsistencies in the results of the two experiments might be attributed to an 
inherent difference between the two case studies. One could argue, for example, 
that the parking case is much more common and ubiquitous than the Disneyland 
case is, and therefore those differences might translate into the outcome. 
Whereas the results about the relationship between gender and lower levels of 
suspicion of the disability con align with those from a previous study,176 the results 
about relationship with disability seem to contradict earlier findings. Previous 
research about fear of the disability con that used an observational (rather than 
experimental) survey design found that participants with a personal relationship 
with disability were more suspicious of the disability con.177 This contradiction can 
be explained by the common notion in social science that more abstract questions 
about a phenomenon receive different answers than questions asked in context do. 
This phenomenon has been widely known in political science research as “Fenno’s 
 
174. This finding fits with the observation that the social identity of the person making the 
judgment, and the other who is being judged, influences the determination of deservingness. People are 
more likely to determine that their in-group members are deserving in comparison to out-group 
members. See FEATHER, supra note 4, at 6. 
175. In the 60 Minutes Wait vs. 3 Minutes Wait Disneyland experiment (SSI 2), the regression 
shows that only participants with disabilities who felt suspected themselves were statistically significantly 
less suspicious compared with those with no relationship with disability (p < 0.01). See supra Table 3. 
176. See Dorfman, supra note 18, at 1072, 1074, 1076–77. 
177. Id. at 1073–74, 1077–78. 
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paradox.”178 Public opinion surveys demonstrate the phenomenon that individual 
members of Congress have relatively high approval ratings, while simultaneously, 
Congress as a whole has a very low approval rating.179 Similarly, although the 
majority of public school parents said that they would give their child’s school a 
grade of “A” or “B,” just 17% of these same participants would give “public schools 
nationally” the same high score.180 Thus, when asked general questions about abuse 
of disability law in the first study, participants with a relationship to disability 
answered differently than they did in this study, which presented concrete cases 
(parking and lines). 
Although descriptive data, like that obtained through an observational survey 
in the previous study, give a glance into the respondents’ broader world view (how 
much disability con there is generally), the experimental results test for the effect of 
encountering disability in a familiar context. The experimental results are powerful 
because they speak to a person’s contextual behavioral decision-making process. 
Because they point to the factors that influence decision-making, the experimental 
results have strong real-world implications for the design of laws regulating the 
relationship between disabled and nondisabled individuals. 
C. The Consequences of Mistrust 
The public fear of the disability con has a negative effect on people with 
disabilities. On the individual level, they worry about being judged negatively for 
using the disabled parking placard and are frequently harassed or questioned about 
their status. Furthermore, because fear of the disability con translates into law, the 
disability community often needs to navigate defensive practices that limit the scope 
of accommodations they previously enjoyed.181 This point is clearly demonstrated 
in the context of the disability policy at Disney parks. 
1. Private Enforcement 
In July 2016, one man in the San Francisco Bay Area consulted his neighbors 
in an email titled “Handicap parking abuse” sent to a local neighborhood electronic 
 
178. RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS  
164–68 (1978). 
179. Laurel Harbridge & Neil Malhotra, Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in  
Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 494, 507 (2011); see also  
Elizabeth Mendes, Americans Down on Congress, OK with Own Representative, GALLUP (May 9, 2013),  
http://news.gallup.com/poll/162362/americans-down-congress-own-representative.aspx [https://
perma.cc/874W-3NJT]. 
180. See Catherine Rampell, Actually, Public Education Is Getting Better, Not Worse,  
WASH. POST  (Sept.  18,  2014),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/catherine-rampell-
actually-public-education-is-getting-better-not-worse/2014/09/18/7c23b020-3f6a-11e4-9587-
5dafd96295f0_story.html?utm_term=.b807e4b8a2b2 [https://perma.cc/KCK7-M4Q7]. 
181. For examples of the translation of the fear of the disability con into disability laws, see 
Dorfman, supra note 18, at 1057–58, 1086–87. 
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mailing list. This email demonstrates the lack of trust in authorities to enforce 
disabled parking rules and the need for private enforcement: 
What is the best way to deal with people abusing the system? Every day I 
watch as people with permits park in the 4-hr zone (for the entire day) 
jaywalk across Key Blvd and navigate the parking lot between cars to the 
BART [Bay Area Rapid Transit] . . . Clearly these folks are gaming the 
system for free long term parking, and all it does is make the street 
unparkable for residents. Passive aggressive notes on windows? 
Confrontational YouTube videos? Just highly doubt ECPD [El Cerrito 
Police Department] can or will do anything . . .182 
Administration of disability law and policies in general, and of disabled parking 
in particular, is often left to private enforcement by citizens. This is especially true 
in everyday situations when formal law enforcement is absent.183 Disabled parking 
is a prime example of situations in which laypeople enforce legal standards 
according to the way those rules are communicated to them by the state and their 
understanding of those rules.184 
Scholars have shown the private enforcement of disabled parking to be a social 
phenomenon that takes on many forms. Disability studies scholar Ellen Samuels 
documented the online traffic in HandicappedFraud.org, a website founded in 2007 
as a community service surveillance project with the goal of ending the misuse of 
disabled parking placards.185 The website allows individuals to report violations of 
disabled parking rules along with a description of the incident; photos can be posted 
as well. Samuels documents responses on the website by people who were wrongly 
suspected of fraud, asking reporters “not to jump to conclusions.”186 Legal scholar 
Geoffrey Miller analyzed stories in local newspapers and letters to the editors to 
create a typology of responses from enforcers.187 Those reactions range from giving 
friendly and cordial advice to the “violator” to confrontation (whether face-to-face 
or by leaving a note) and even retribution (by causing harm to the “violator’s” 
vehicle, blocking the “violator” into the space, and even physical violence).188 
 
182. Email sent to a listserv called “Nextdoor El Cerrito del Norte (Inner)” on the morning of 
July 27, 2016. On record with the author. 
183. BAGENSTOS, supra note 42, at 32; MARUSEK, supra note 25, at 138–39. 
184. Miller, supra note 165, at 903. 
185. SAMUELS, supra note 17, at 133; HANDICAPPEDFRAUD.COM,  
https://www.myparkingsign.com/handicapped-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/42AH-UVZ7] ( last visited 
Nov. 16, 2019 ). 
186. SAMUELS, supra note 17, at 139. There are also smart phone apps that enable the reporting 
of abuse to local authorities, but those usually regard instances in which no placards were displayed at 
all in the car and thus are beyond the scope of disabled parking placard abuse. One of those apps, called 
Parking Mobility, requires a photo of the car’s windshield to prove there is no placard in place. See 
Richard Read, Finally: An App to Report Drivers Illegally Parked in Handicapped Spots, CAR 
CONNECTION (Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.thecarconnection.com/news/1086743_finally-an-app-to-
report-drivers-illegally-parked-in-handicapped-spots [https://perma.cc/MT3C-5KKW]. 
187. Miller, supra note 165, at 898. 
188. Id. at 916–32. For a few recent examples of such reactions published in the media, see 
Jennifer Earl, Student Undergoing Radiation Publicly Shamed for Using Handicapped Spot, CBS NEWS 
Final to Printer_Dorfman.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/31/20  4:09 PM 
2020] [UN]USUAL SUSPECTS 601 
David Brown,189 a deputy director at a California DMV, said in an interview 
that because of the fear of confrontation, the DMV does not encourage people to 
record suspicious disabled parking placard use. However, officially, the California 
DMV does encourage individuals to report potential abusers to its hotline.190 Illinois 
has a similar policy, as Tamara Woodward, who works on disabled parking policy 
at the Illinois Secretary of State, explained: 
We have an “email hotline.” So, when someone sees abuse, they can shoot 
us an email . . . and we take a look to see whether we need to pursue this 
further. What we see with the email is that we have some very zealous 
people, for a lack of a better term, who would just literally sit in the 
Walmart parking lot all day long and do nothing but take down license 
plates of individuals who park in the disabled parking spots and don’t have 
a placard . . . and I would say 70% of the time, these are people who do 
have placards who just forgot to hang them up . . . . We also get somebody 
who will write in and say, “This person parked in the disabled spot, and 
they don’t look disabled,” and things like that. And we’ll always have to 
come back and say that to this person—we respect this person’s opinion, 
and we also train our law enforcement this way, but disabilities are not 
always visible. 
Things can escalate, as Woodward mentioned: “We do have situations where 
people would actually confront other people in the parking lot . . . and that can end 
up being a very dangerous situation.” 
Two incidents in Florida in July 2018 are an example of those types of 
“dangerous situations.” On July 16, a 40-year-old man was critically injured after 
being stabbed repeatedly with a folding knife by 43-year-old “self-appointed 
guardian of disabled parking spaces” after being suspected of disability con.191 Three 
days later, on July 19, 2018, a 28-year-old man who arrived with his girlfriend and 
son to a convenience store in Clearwater was shot to death by a 47-year-old  
 
(Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/student-undergoing-radiation-treatments-publicly-
shamed/ [https://perma.cc/CA6P-MGH2]; Mom of Terminally Ill Son Shamed for Parking in 
Handicapped Spot, FOX NEWS (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/12/07/mom-
terminally-ill-son-shamed-for-parking-in-handicapped-spot.html [https://perma.cc/A2TW-WTDB]; 
Sarah Moessinger, I’m Tired of People Telling Me I Don’t ‘Look Sick’ Because I Am, KVELLER  
(Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.kveller.com/im-tired-of-people-telling-me-i-dont-look-sick-because-i-
am/[https://perma.cc/82C4-TGNW]; Gina Szajnuk, To the Person Who Left Me a Rude Note After I 
Parked in a Disability Spot, MIGHTY ( Jan. 4, 2017), https://themighty.com/2017/01/response-to-
rude-note-after-parking-in-disability-spot/ [https://perma.cc/9WGX-YLDB]. 
189. See supra note 100. 
190. See David Fleshler, Parking Lot Vigilantes Abuse Woman with ‘Invisible’ Disability, SOUTH 
FLA. SUN SENTINEL ( Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-disabled-tag-
20150102-story.html [https://perma.cc/V5VL-H8UG]; David Lazarus, How to Report Bogus Use of a 
Disabled Parking Placard, L.A. TIMES (May 6, 2015), http://beta.latimes.com/business/la-fi-laz-
reporting-disabled-placard-fraud-20150506-column.html [https://perma.cc/LXS2-RGPA]. 
191. Cohen, supra note 1. 
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“self-appointed wannabe cop”192 after an altercation about the first one's parking 
in a disabled spot.193 The shooter was described by the local sheriff as a person who 
“lives in the area, was a frequent customer of the store and somebody who others 
have said complained about people parking in the handicapped spots, and he had 
an issue with people who illegally parked in handicapped spots.”194 
Interviewees for this research had their own stories of being wrongfully 
accused of gaming the system. Jennifer, a 21-year-old college student who is a 
double amputee, said: 
I guess I can’t even count the number of times that I’ve been questioned, 
especially in parking lots . . . People will give dirty looks, or they will pull 
up to the parking spot right next to me and they like look at me and I’m 
like [laughs] why do you [look at me]? Sometime I get aggressive [laughs]. 
There was one time when my little brother and my dad and I were going 
to the mall to shop for Christmas presents, and we have parked in the front 
row spot cause it was icy and I don’t do well on ice, and some man starts 
following behind us and he’s grumbling and very clearly upset about us 
parking in the front spot. So my dad turns around and he’s like: “Excuse 
me? Can we help you?” 
And he [the man] is like: “You don’t need that parking spot . . . I’m the 
‘parking lot police,’” and he wasn’t official but [said], “I’d like to think of 
that as my title, and I go around making sure that people who don’t need 
it don’t use it.” And my dad [said]: “Well, for your information, one of us 
is disabled and has prosthetic limbs, so we do in fact need the spot,” and 
the guy was like: “Well, you’re walking fine, so I don’t believe you,” I mean 
he was really nasty . . . And I have never seen my dad get so mad. 
The extreme private enforcement can even deter people with disabilities from 
using a disabled placard, preventing them from going out in public.195  
Thirty-eight-year-old Brenda, who lives with myasthenia gravis (a form of muscle 
fluctuation) and learning disabilities, said: 
I don’t use a disabled parking permit. I have actually been harassed when 
trying to [do so] . . . at one time I had it in Southern California when . . . I 
actually had a woman yell at me and pursue me in the parking lot . . . and I 
didn’t feel safe having a simple tag up [that identifies me as disabled]. 
In a survey I conducted for another study,196 a 47-year-old wrote, “I have not 
requested a disabled parking tag, because I’m terrified of being harassed.” A  
 
192. David Boroff, Gunman in ‘Stand Your Ground’ Parking Lot Shooting Charged with 
Manslaughter, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/ny-news-
stand-your-ground-florida-20180813-story.html [https://perma.cc/KSB9-NUFK]. 
193. Jacobs, supra note 1. 
194. Pinellas Sheriff, Sheriff’s Press Conference- July 20, 2018- Shooting  
Investigation- Unincorporated Clearwater, YOUTUBE ( July 20, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=MyiMpmZGZEk&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/L8DU-FXTT]. 
195. See Dorfman, supra note 18, at 1082–83. 
196. Id. at 1064–65. 
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60-year-old wrote, “It happens all the time, to the point where I now avoid people.” 
Another 33-year-old was more explicit: 
I never reapplied for a parking plaque even though not having one has 
often caused me to avoid going to stores. If I can’t get a close spot, 
sometimes I have to leave. I used to have one, but nearly every time I went 
out, I got verbally attacked, so it just became easier to adjust without 
one . . . I’ve been attacked and berated all because I’m young and don’t 
look disabled. I have congenital heart disease and Ehlers-Danlos syndrome 
along with incomplete paraplegia. Getting around is hard, getting a parking 
permit is harder, and actually using one is impossible. 
The stereotype of disability con has been shown to have a chilling effect on 
the use of rights by people with disabilities, a consequence that hinders the law’s 
aspiration of inclusion. There is a need to restore the public trust in disability law 
and to mitigate the stereotype. Those goals can be accomplished through a series of 
strategies related to the amendment of policies, enforcement, and improving 
intergroup relations. 
2. The Price of Defensive Policies 
Other than causing harassment and questioning at the individual level, as seen 
in the case of disabled parking placards, the fear of disability con has an effect on 
law and policy creation and implementation. People with disabilities need to 
navigate stricter policies based on the fear of abuse. Changes in Disney’s disability 
policies are a prime example of the institutional burdens for people with disabilities. 
A reading of the Disney briefs in the A.L. case gives the impression that 
despite the fact that Disney did not have sufficient data on the scope of abuse of 
the GAC system, Disney was more worried about the way the public reacted to the 
news media, specifically around the “tour guides” scandal, and thus reacted by 
enacting new rules. In his deposition, Bruce Laval, former vice president of 
Operations Planning and Development for Walt Disney Parks and Resorts, said that 
the abuse of GAC was egregious because: 
It was all over social media . . . . And when that gets out in social media, it 
was more and more people doing it [selling GAC cards or “tour guide 
services”] as a business so you can’t control that number . . . I also read it 
in the newspaper . . . I saw it on a news report somewhere when I was 
watching TV.197 
What really motivated Disney to change its policy was the concern about its 
wholesome reputation and sense of control over the parks rather than the actual 
effects of the abuse. As highlighted earlier, the idea of control in the Disney parks 
is a top priority. 
 
197. Deposition of Bruce Laval at 92–93, A.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, 
900 F.3d 1270 ( July 18, 2018) (Doc 159-1, Ex-5). 
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As a consequence, disabled guests claim that new DAS system burdens parties 
that include guests with disabilities who now must plan their visits based on further 
restrictions other than those caused by their impairments198 and make their way 
across the park many times to pick up a return time ticket for each attraction.199 
Disabled guests, who frequent the park, suffered the consequences of a defensive 
policy. Recognizing this, the Eleventh Circuit sided with the plaintiffs, eventually 
convinced by the evidence presented by the plaintiffs in the appeal that they do have 
problems transitioning from one activity to the other, when not done in a strict 
routine, without having meltdowns.200 
Whether Disney could have tolerated a certain level of abuse to better 
accommodate its disabled guests’ needs is a question that stands at the heart of the 
complex issue of fear of the disability con. It seems that had Disney not given into 
the media frenzy, which would have likely abated, Disney would not have 
“punished” some of its loyal guests because of isolated acts of abuse. There could 
have been a better, more moral solution implemented under the circumstances. 
D. Perception vs. Reality: Assessing the Scope of Abuse 
This Article seeks to empirically examine public perceptions and stereotypes 
about “faking disability” to abuse the law. Its main goal is not to objectively assess 
how much abuse there really is.201 Nevertheless, as this Article focuses on two 
specific case studies, I was able to obtain some data on the scope of actual abuse of 
disabled parking placards and of the disability policy in Disney parks. As with any 
study of fraud, adequate data are hard to obtain;202 however, the data indicate a 
lower level of abuse than perhaps expected. 
1. Disabled Parking Placards 
Citation data from the California DMV during the period 2013–2016 suggest 
that 15% of the placards checked were used fraudulently.203 Using press releases 
 
198. Hetter, supra note 136. 
199. Gibson, supra note 124; A.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc., 900 
F.3d 1270, 1284 (11th Cir. 2018). 
200. Id. at 1297. 
201. The theory behind studying the “social construction of social problems” was developed in 
the 1970s by sociologists Herbert Blumer, Malcolm Spector, and John Kitsuse. It suggests that what is 
often referred to as social problems or “epidemics” are not purely objective and identifiable societal 
conditions but are framed and constructed by members of society, interest groups, and the media. This 
construction stands alone from the “objective” nature of the problem and is worthy of sociological 
inquiry in and of itself. See MALCOLM SPECTOR & JOHN I. KITSUSE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL 
PROBLEMS 53, 77 (1977); Herbert Blumer, Social Problems As Collective Behavior, 18 SOC. PROBS. 298, 
300 (1971). For a discussion of the importance of studying the fear of the disability con as a constructed 
social problem, see Dorfman, supra note 18, at 1056. 
202. DEBORAH L. RHODE, CHEATING: ETHICS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 4 (2018). 
203. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 94, at 34. Fraudulent use of a placard means either the 
use of a valid placard by someone who is ineligible (when the placard owner is not in the vehicle) or 
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from sting operations conducted in California from 2017 to 2018,204 I found that 
the average use of fraudulent parking placards stood at 11% (ranging between  
7% and 15%) [see Table 5].205 These numbers might be lower than expected 
considering that the abuse of disabled parking placards is perceived to be a major 
problem.206 It is much harder to assess how many placards were obtained illegally 
by falsifying documents, malingering,207 or paying a “crooked doctor.” This is 
because the question of whether a person actually “needs” the disabled parking 
permit was recognized by policy makers in many of the states as a subjective 





the use of an invalid placard, one that has been stolen, found, or is no longer valid. Identifying the real 
owners in those circumstances can be done relatively easily by using the DMV’s databases. 
204. After the release of a report on the issue in April 2017, the California DMV started 
publishing monthly press releases on the sting operations conducted. For the database containing the 
press releases, see CA Department of Motor Vehicles News Releases, ST. CAL. DEP’T MOTOR 
VEHICLES, https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/?1dmy&urile=wcm:path:/dmv_content_en/
landing%2Bpages/toc1 [https://perma.cc/XB5Z-NCAP] ( last visited Nov. 16, 2019 ). Other than 
sting operations, in 2019, the city of Los Angeles also significantly increased the fines for the abuse of 
disabled placards as another way to create deterrence and try to combat fraud and abuse. See Sonja 
Sharp, L.A. Quadruples the Fines for Disabled-Placard Fraud, But Will It Help?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 
2019), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-disabled-placard-fraud-los-angeles-20190421-
story.html [https://perma.cc/XD9C-AX6C]. 
205. It is important to note that the sting operations are conducted in “hot spots,” popular 
locations where there is a lot of traffic and parking is scarce and which are reported to the DMV by the 
public. It might be that in less crowded locations there is even less improper use than was found during 
the sting operations. 
206. For example: Parking enforcement officials at five out of six cities in California stated that 
placard misuse was a big problem. See CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 94, at 13. In a previous survey 
I conducted, 46% (494 out of 1,085) answered that it is common for people who do not have disabilities 
to use a disabled parking permit to park in disabled parking spots. The question asked: “How common 
is it for people who do not have disabilities to use a disabled parking permit in order to park in disabled 
parking spots?” The answers were given on a 1–5 Likert scale. Five percent (51 out of 1,085 
respondents) answered it is extremely common; 16% (176 respondents) answered it is very common; 
and 25% (270 respondents) said it was moderately common. These numbers are high, specifically if 
one accounts for a social desirability bias that is expected to play a role in these types of surveys. See 
John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 28 (1983); Dorfman, supra note 18, at 1066. 
207. Malinger, according to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, means “to pretend or exaggerate 
incapacity or illness (as to avoid duty or work).” Malinger, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/malinger [https://perma.cc/YZL6-GVHA] ( last 
visited Nov. 16, 2019 ). 
208. Miller & Singer, supra note 82, at 91. 
209. While it offered no data with respect to malingering or purposefully submitting falsified 
documents, the California report did find that 73% (70 out of 96) of the applications for placards that 
were awarded were inadequate when compared with legal standards: there was not a full description of 
the disability needed to determine eligibility. See CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 94, at 16. However, 
David Brown (pseudonym), a deputy director at a California DMV, who went over the same sample, 
assured me that while the applications did not contain a “complete description of the disability,”  
90% of the sample did contain sufficient information to tell that the applicant is permanently disabled. 
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Table 5. Scope of Parking Placard Fraud in California  
between April 2017 and April 2018 
Note: Data presented in this table is based on author’s calculation of the CA DMV Office of 
Public Relations’ Press Releases. 
2. Disney Disability Policy Abuse 
How much fraud was there at Disneyland? It is difficult to know. A few 
interviewees testified to seeing such abuse. For example, 32-year-old Ashley, who 
has cerebral palsy, said: 
I go to Disneyland every year . . . and people would, you know, you get a 
wheelchair from Disneyland and sit in it and they would go on a ride and 
they would get out of the chair [and] walk until [they got to] the ride, like 
normal, and then somebody else would get in the chair when they got off 
the ride. So, they would switch who will get in the chair at the ride. For me, 
I was like “what the heck?” 
Reading Disney’s trial brief, expert witness reports, and depositions from the 
A.L. case only reveals anecdotal information.210 Disney mentions the issue of the 
 
210. “At least on one occasion, Guest Relations employees at the Magic Kingdom [park at 
Disney World, which most resembles the Disneyland park] witnessed a teenage boy celebrating with 
his friends after leaving City Hall with GAC. More egregiously, some guests created counterfeit GACs, 
posted Craigslist ads offering the use of GACs — at the cost of thousands of dollars — for 
unauthorized “tours” of Walt Disney World, and used the Internet to sell unexpired GACs.” Document 
217 Filed 1/29/2016. The incident involving the teenage boy is reminiscent of a story featuring teen 
2017/2018 Number    






of Citations                    
issued 
              Percentage     
           of Fraudulent  
                    Use 
April 12 3,142 417 13% 
May  16 1,175 135 11% 
June 22 1,633 195 12% 
July 24 1,596 170 11% 
August  21 1,676 145 9% 
September 25 3,700 555 15% 
October 21 1,622 135 8% 
November 27 2,016 171 8% 
December 21 2,106 150 7% 
January 22 1,822 185 10% 
February 20 1,582 153 10% 
March 20 2,050 167 8% 
April 22 4,951 381 8% 
   Mean:     11%                 
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disabled “tour guides” along with a study it conducted at Disney World in April 
2013 called, “The GAC Easter Study,” which measured the volume of guests using 
GAC.211 Unfortunately, the actual number of guests using the GAC, like other 
valuable information, was blacked out and cannot be accessed on the electronic case 
file.212 In the A.L. appeal, Disney argued that even if altering the DAS could be 
considered a “necessary modification,” it still is unreasonable, as it would open the 
door to the same kind of abuse of the GAC system.213 Recognizing that the question 
of whether altering the DAS system would fundamentally alter the park experience 
for visitors because of abuse has to do with substantial factual inquiry, the Eleventh 
Circuit remanded the issue to the district court.214 
When Alison Armor, director of Distribution Services at Disney World, who 
was part of the team that devised the DAS reform, was asked in her deposition 
about the prevalence of the “tour guide” abuse, she answered: “People had anecdotal 
knowledge of it, but it’s not something people were advertising and letting us know 
‘hi, I’m here as a tour guide to pick up my GAC card and sell my services’ . . . It was 
impossible to formally study.”215 
In addition, the “tour guides” abuse, which generated a massive amount of 
bad press, was not the major cause of abuse. Armor said: 
What we felt like, though, was the major sources of abuse were coming more from 
guests just fabricating their needs to get the pass for themselves because there was 
really no reason to pay for a guide if you were willing to just go and ask for 
a pass for yourself. We felt that was a major form [of abuse].216 
In any case, the new DAS policy does not eliminate the potential for abuse or 
at least the perception of abuse by other guests, because Disney legally cannot 
require any documentation when someone requests the DAS card at the park 
entrance.217 However, Armor said that the new DAS gives Disney a better sense of 
control: 
 
sensation Justin Bieber uploading a picture of himself to social media using a wheelchair in Disneyland, 
which allowed him to “cut all lines.” Price Peterson, Wheelchair-Bound Justin Bieber Cut All the Lines 
at Disneyland,  WIRE ( July 24, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/07/
wheelchair-bound-justin-bieber-cut-all-the-lines-at-disneyland/374944/ [https://perma.cc/E4GA-
AGAW]. 
211. Laval, supra note 197, at 15. 
212. In any case, this report only showed an increase of GAC users in the park and does not 
indicate how many of them obtained the card illegally. Id. 
213. A.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Disney, 900 F.3d 1270, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018). In the appeal process the 
plaintiffs argued that they are not asking for a return to the GAC system but request for a modification 
of DAS system. See id. 
214. Id. 
215. Deposition of Alison Armor at 53–54, A.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Disney, 900 F.3d 1270 ( July 18, 
2018) (Doc 159–2, Ex-6). 
216. Id. 
217. The rule prohibiting the inquiry of someone about his or her disability when receiving 
public accommodation is found in the ADA regulations. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(6) (2016) (“A public 
accommodation shall not ask about the nature or extent of a person’s disability [and] shall not require 
documentation . . . .”). The rationale behind the rule relates to other cherished values in American 
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We believe it [the DAS] is highly sought after . . . . Well, speaking on fraud 
in general, we do feel that although people are still wanting and desiring 
the pass and potentially fabricating the need for DAS, we have put some 
limits in place as it pertains to transferability . . . . You can’t sell it on the 
street corner [or online].218 
Essentially, the DAS does not curb the potential abuse; it just makes the 
appearance of the Disney experience seem fairer: People with the card do not get 
the “celebrity treatment,” and the public concern about “disabled tour guides” has 
been removed. Nevertheless, shortly after the tour guide controversy broke, Disney 
parks started to offer “VIP tours” with official tour guides, which include 
“expedited access to over 30 favorite Disneyland Resort attractions, Character 
Greetings and shows,” to those who are willing to pay hundreds of dollars for this 
service.219 These VIP tours are exemplary of situations in which the ethics of 
queues—“first come, first served”—is being replaced by the ethics of  
markets—“you get what you pay for.”220 This phenomenon, which was pointed out 
by philosopher Michael Sandal, is controversial because the democratic ideas of 
fairness and equality represented by the queuing system still dominate public 
opinion. It appears that for Disney, the ethics of queues is only given priority when 
it comes to disability policy, but comes in second to the ethics of markets that seem 
to trump any other consideration. 
V. RESTORING TRUST IN DISABILITY LAW 
In this Part, I outline policy recommendations to help alleviate fear of the 
disability con and to enable people with disabilities to more easily and safely exercise 
their legal rights and accommodations in public spaces, specifically parking lots and 
lines. As the findings from this research could be expanded to other rights-based 
policies outside of the disability realm, so too could the recommendations in this 
part be applied to other social groups such as the recipients of health care and public 
benefits, immigrants, and asylum seekers. 
Before I elaborate on strategies to increase trust and support of policies, it 
might be helpful to reiterate what is not required based on this study’s findings. The 
 
society, that of privacy, personal space, and control over disclosure of information (all derived from 
individualism). See L. Robert Kohls, The Values Americans Live By (1984), http://annmarielei.com/
wp-content/uploads/2014/06/The-Values-Americans-Live-By.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PGR-M6 
MB]; P. Wesley Schultz & Lynnette Zelezny, Reframing Environmental Messages to Be Congruent with 
American Values, 10 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 126, 127 (2003). 
218. Armor, supra note 215, at 57–58. 
219. Disneyland Resort VIP Tours, DISNEYLAND.COM, https://disneyland.disney.go.com/
events-tours/vip-tour-services/ [https://perma.cc/3BVM-JP45 ] ( last visited Nov. 20, 2019 ); VIP  
Services, WALT DISNEY WORLD.COM, https://disneyworld.disney.go.com/events-tours/vip-tour-
services/ [https://perma.cc/8XBT-2NRA] ( last visited Nov. 20, 2019 ). 
220. See SANDEL, supra note 118, at 28. Other situations include “Lexus Lanes,” where the right 
to jump the queue is available for purchase, whether in other tourist attractions, airports, or highways, 
or “concierge doctors” available 24/7 with no line to make an appointment, for those who are willing 
to pay. Id. at 19–21, 25–27. 
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experiments demonstrate that there is no need to invest in greater resources for 
public use, to fight scarcity, in order to increase public trust. In other words, there 
is no need to build more parking spots or more rides to enable theme park guests 
to spread across multiple queues. People are willing to wait in line longer or spend 
more time looking for parking if they know that the person receiving the 
accommodation, oftentimes at their expense, is in fact deserving. The current 
mandate of eligibility for protection under disability law needs to be better 
communicated to the public, and the public view of deservingness should be better 
aligned with formal law. 
This conclusion will seem like good news to some yet bad news to others. 
Changing public perceptions and reducing stereotypes is no easy task.221 It might be 
much more complicated than fighting scarcity or encouraging people to give up 
their place in line or to find another parking spot, as they will do these things if they 
know that their effort helped a deserving person. The change needs to be in the way 
people understand both disability and the law. The goal of this part is to provide 
strategies and some concrete ideas on how to accomplish this challenging task. 
A. Reducing the Deservingness Bias: Reframing Disability 
Both types of the formal signs of disabled parking, the street parking sign and 
the placard itself, use the International Symbol of Access depicting a white stylized 
image of a person in a wheelchair on a blue background that has been commonly 
known as “handicapped blue.”222 This worldwide symbol has become “the 
prototypic representation of disability in Western societies.”223 The International 
Symbol of Access has been successful in raising public awareness of the issue of 
disability accommodations. At the same time and perhaps because it was the way to 
educate the public about the existence of disability rights, it also defined a narrow 
view of disability as solely a physical, clearly visible condition, specifically that of 
the wheelchair user.224 The symbol thus created a deservingness cognitive bias 
 
221. THOMAS F. PETTIGREW & LINDA R. TROPP, WHEN GROUPS MEET: THE DYNAMIC OF 
INTERGROUP CONTACT 101 (2011); David J. Schneider, Modern Stereotype Research: Unfinished 
Business, in STEREOTYPES AND STEREOTYPING 419, 438–39 (C. Neil Macrae, Charles Stangor & Miles 
Hewstone, eds., 1996). 
222. KATIE ELLIS & GERARD GOGGIN, DISABILITY AND THE MEDIA 1 (2015). 
223. Liat Ben-Moshe & Justin J.W. Powell, Sign of Our Time? Revis(it)ing the International 
Symbol of Access, 22 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 489, 497 (2007). 
224. See generally id. In 2012, the international symbol of access was revisited and a “Dynamic 
Symbol of Access” was introduced and since became popular. Nevertheless, even this new incarnation 
showcasing the disabled person “moving around the world” instead of “blocky and rigid,” it still 
arguably depicts disability in a narrow way as only a physical condition. See Natasha Frost, The 
Controversial Process of Redesigning the Wheelchair Symbol, ATLAS OBSCURA (Mar. 29, 2018), https://
www.atlasobscura.com/articles/wheelchair-symbol-redesign?utm_source=Commission%20for% 
20Persons%20with%20Disabilities%20-%20Newsletters&utm_campaign=4%2F2%2F2018%20- 
%20Community%20Update&utm_medium=email [https://perma.cc/46RB-NTLY]. A recent study 
has shown that people with mobility-physical disabilities rated the symbol more favorably compared to 
individuals with other types of disabilities. See Jason Vice, Beth A. Barstow, Sean Bowman, Tapan Metha 
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against other types of disabilities.225 It has also been criticized for encouraging a 
“social gaze” of those using disabled parking spaces.226 The gaze is aimed at 
scrutinizing the person getting out of the car, seeking to locate differences in his or 
her appearance, behavior, and surroundings that would make this person worthy of 
the special right. 
Because the legal protection of disability status extends to a wide array of 
impairments, the way to communicate the law to the public is by using a symbol, or 
a series of symbols, that encompasses the heterogeneity of this protected category. 
However, developing a new symbol of access could be a difficult task considering 
the politics within the diverse disability community.227 
A more concrete and easier strategy to implement is to apply a broader pallet 
of colors, each signifying a different type of impairment, to the disabled parking 
permit system. The concept is that rather than having only one type of placard 
painted “handicapped blue,” we could print placards in a variety of colors, each 
one’s signaling a different type of disability (for example: respiratory, neurological, 
or physical). Such a system should not include too many categories as to respect the 
privacy of the placard owner. The idea is not to create a tier system, as all of the 
placards regardless of color would have the same exact parking privileges. This new 
system would reduce the element of surprise felt due to uncertainty regarding 
another’s belonging to the protected group.228 It would thus lessen the frequency 
of the social gaze because laypeople would learn to associate a color with the type 
of disability that is not necessarily clear at first glance and would increase 
interpersonal trust. The development of such a color system could be implemented 
in other contexts where queuing is used such as at airports, theme parks, museums, 
government offices, and so on. 
 
& Sangeetha Padalabalanarayanan, Effectiveness of the International Symbol of Access and Inclusivity of 
Other Disability Groups, 13 DISABILITY & HEALTH J. 1, 3–4 (2020). 
225. For one of the classic articles discussing the ways cognitive biases play a significant role in 
antidiscrimination law, see generally Krieger, supra note 156. 
226. MARUSEK, supra note 25, at 62–63; ROSEMARIE GARLAND-THOMSON, STARING: HOW 
WE LOOK 20 (2009). For a general analysis of how the aesthetic markers of disability affect the way 
disability antidiscrimination law manifests itself, see Jasmine Harris, The Aesthetic of Disability, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 895, 951–61 (2019). 
227. A recent attempt to create a series of symbols was made by the London office of the global 
advertising agency McCann Erickson in 2018. Under a campaign called Visability93, the agency created 
a collection of twenty-seven new icons aimed at representing different disabilities — from epilepsy to 
diabetes and Alzheimer’s. Sarah Dawood, Why the Wheelchair Symbol Should Be Rethought to Include 
“Invisible Disabilities, DESIGN WK. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.designweek.co.uk/issues/30-july-5-
august-2018/why-the-wheelchair-symbol-should-be-rethought-to-include-invisible-disabilities/ 
[https://perma.cc/6UNZ-R6K3]. The campaign was criticized by some members of the disability 
community for focusing on the impairment (which was actually drawn as part of each symbol) and for 
sending a stigmatizing message that resonates with a deficit view of disability. It was also considered 
too ambitious, “gimmicky,” and unpractical due to the large number of icons. 
228. KAREN S. COOK, RUSSELL HARDIN & MARGARET LEVI, COOPERATION WITHOUT 
TRUST? 65 (2007); Karen S. Cook & Alexandra Gerbasi, Trust, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY 331, 332 (Peter Hedström & Peter Bearman, eds., 2011). 
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Another way of priming public awareness is by reminding laypeople of the 
fluid nature of disability by placing affirmative statements on public information 
markers at theme parks, parking lots, and other public spaces. These types of 
interventions, known as “framing rules,”229 aimed at reframing attitudes around 
disability could become effective over time, specifically if they are implemented with 
high intensity.230 
B. Taking Action Against Private Enforcement 
As findings from the interviews demonstrate, people with disabilities are often 
harassed by other laypeople when using a disabled parking permit, and some have 
even become reluctant to use their permits. This harassment can even escalate to 
extreme physical violence and even death. Although this study did not find evidence 
for harassment in the Disneyland line context, literature on queuing indicates that 
private enforcement practices are common in those circumstances, too.231 This type 
of harassing behavior, which might only be attributed to a relatively small 
percentage of the population, has a significant effect on the lives of disabled 
individuals and needs to be curbed by official law enforcement. The police should 
make an effort to prevent laypeople from harassing disabled individuals. An idea 
for such a policy could be a formal mechanism like a “hotline” for individuals who 
have been harassed to be able to file a complaint with law enforcement. The same 
way that such hotlines exist to report potential abuse, they could also create a 
solution for people with disabilities who have suffered the consequences of fear of 
the disability con. The repercussions of such harassment by private enforcers could 
range from warnings, fines, or even harsher punishments depending on state laws 
that usually include prohibitions regarding harassment of people with disabilities 
using public accommodations. Establishing a public shaming mechanism against 
self-appointed guardians of disabled parking spaces, similar to the one that exists 
against people who allegedly abuse the system through websites like 
Handicappedfraud.org,232 will also help deter zealous and harmful private 
enforcement. 
 
229. Emens, supra note 26, at 1409–10 (discussing “framing rules” to shape attitudes toward 
disability that are similar to a broad-based public education campaign, except that it targets particular 
moments when people are primed to think about the problem at hand). 
230. Sarah Clement, Francesca Lassman, Elizabeth Barley, Sara Evans-Lacko, Paul Williams, 
Sosei Yamaguchi, Mike Slade, Nicolas Rüsch & Graham Thornicroft, Mass Media Interventions for 
Reducing Mental Health-Related Stigma (Review), THE COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC  
REVS. 1, 7 (2013); Graham Thornicroft, Nisha Mehta, Sarah Clement, Sara Evans-Lacko, Mary Doherty, 
Diana Rose, Mirja Koschorke, Rahul Shidhaye, Claire O’Reilly & Claire Henderson, Evidence for 
Effective Interventions to Reduce Mental-health-related Stigma and Discrimination, 387 LANCET 1123, 1125 
(2016). 
231. Milgram et al., supra note 166, 683–86; Perry & Zarsky, supra note 118, at 1599; Young, 
supra note 3, at 76, 82. 
232. SAMUELS, supra note 17, at 133. 
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Although federal courts found that the ADA cannot apply to claims against 
homeowner associations that did not prevent harassment of tenants’ use of disabled 
parking placards,233 courts have been responsive to claims of harassment against 
perpetrators. In Skeens v. Shetter,234 a police sergeant who was not in uniform and 
did not identify himself as an officer harassed a woman who was using a disabled 
parking placard in a store’s parking lot. He blocked her from exiting the lot using 
his truck and later followed her to her house requesting to speak with her about the 
incident, all while doubting her right to use the parking.235 After the woman brought 
a harassment and official misconduct charge against the policeman, he filed a suit 
alleging malicious prosecution. The U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey dismissed the officer’s claim and held that the woman’s complaint was 
reliable. The court found that:  
Plaintiff, a public servant, berated Shetter [the defendant], intimidated her 
and at one point threatened her with a ticket while she stood in a bathrobe 
in front of her home, for the purposes of scaring, harassing and 
intimidating her, all arising out of her use of a handicap parking space 
despite her having a handicapped registration.236  
Courts have found the actions taken by zealous enforcers of disabled parking 
rules to be harassment, delivering messages such as: “However strongly the 
defendant may feel about the use of handicapped parking spaces by persons who 
are not handicapped, her passion does not justify her harassment.”237 In another 
case, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed a ban placed 
on two individuals from visiting a university campus due to continual incidents in 
which they “acted hostile, harassing, disruptive, and aggressive to . . . staff, students, 
and visitors, including a nine-year-old child, a diabetic pregnant woman, and a 
student with spinal meningitis.”238 The court concluded that “even if plaintiffs had 
come onto campus to protect disabled persons’ parking rights, [that] does not mean 
they can conduct themselves in any manner without consequence. The cloak of the 
ADA does not extend its protections that far.”239 These court decisions deliver a 
 
233. Phillips v. Perkiomen Crossing Homeowners Ass’n, No. 95-CV-1535 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 
1995). In that case, Sandra Phillips sued the homeowners association for violating the ADA by allowing 
the neighbors to harass her and her family for having a disabled parking placard. The US District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, determining that 
Title I of the ADA, did not apply because there was no employment relationship between Phillips and 
the association. Title II did not apply because the homeowners’ association is not a “public entity” 
affiliated with a state or local government. And Title III did not apply because the parking lot was not 
a “commercial facility,” affecting commerce and intended for nonresidential use. See also Shuper  
v. Fed. Mgmt. Co., No. 2:10-cv-205-GZS, 2010 BL 409486 (D. Me. Aug. 4, 2010) (affirming the holding 
in Phillips). 
234. Skeens v. Shetter, No. Civ.A. 04-4474 ( JBS), 2006 WL 827782 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2006). 
235. Id. at 1, 6. 
236. Id. at 5. 
237. Com. v. Frith, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 1106, 943 N.E.2d 980 (2011); see also People v. Lakota, 
No.C048609, 2007 WL 242394, at *1, *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2007). 
238. Cottrell v. Rowan Univ., 786 F. Supp. 2d 851, 854 (D.N.J. 2011). 
239. Id. at 860–61. 
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message to disabled persons that reassures them of their rights to use public 
accommodations without being harassed. Reporting harassment derived from fear 
of the disability con via a hotline should be encouraged by the government, just as 
the DMV officially encourages reports of abuse.240 
Another tool for deterring zealous private enforcers of disability rights is tort 
actions by disabled victims against those harassers. Such actions should be taken 
more frequently by disability rights organizations and private lawyers to help usher 
in social change concerning the usage of public disability accommodations.241 
C. Increasing Intergroup Knowledge 
As the findings indicate, an “inside view of disability,”242 through personal 
experience or a close connection with a disabled individual, lowers the level of 
suspicion. To strengthen the sense of deservingness of people with diverse 
disabilities, specifically those who do not fit the narrow perception of what 
constitutes a disability, there needs to be an increase in public empathy and 
understanding (as opposed to mercy or paternalistic attitudes, which are harmful yet 
common ways of relating to disabled individuals). The way to achieve such a goal is 
to effectively communicate to the public the needs of different groups of disabled 
individuals. An effective way of doing so is by facilitating intimate, cooperative, and 
positive interpersonal contacts between nondisabled and disabled individuals.243 
Contact interventions conducted with various populations such as soldiers, medical 
students, and neighbors have yielded positive effects on attitudes toward people 
with disabilities.244 This type of communication, one that conveys the complex ways 
 
240. See supra note 166. 
241. For a review of the barriers standing in the way of plaintiffs with disabilities, see Mor, supra 
note 37, at 637–38. 
242. LONGMORE, supra note 26, at 98–99; Dunn, supra note 15, at 20–22; Emens, supra note 26, 
at 1386. 
243.  Patrick Corrigan & Betsy Gelb, Three Program That Use Mass Approaches to Challenge the 
Stigma of Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 393, 394 (2006); Shannon M. Couture & David  
L. Penn, Interpersonal Contact and the Stigma of Mental Illness: A Review of the Literature, 12 J. MENTAL 
HEALTH 291, 293 (2003); Emens, supra note 26, at 1407–08. For the benefits of contact in challenging 
racial stereotypes, see e.g., Kyneshawau Hurd & Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity Entitlement: Does  
Diversity-Benefits Ideology Undermine Inclusion, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1605, 1621 (2018).  
244. For a recent review of existing research on interpersonal contact interventions, see Shirli 
Werner & Katrina Scior, Interventions Aimed at Tackling Intellectual Disability Stigma: What Works and 
What Still Needs to Be Done, in INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND STIGMA: STEPPING OUT FROM THE 
MARGINS 129, 134–35, 138 (Katrina Scior & Shirli Werner eds., 2016). For experimental research that 
demonstrates the benefits of contact to reducing stigma toward people with mental illness, see e.g., 
Patrick W. Corrigan, Scott B. Morris, Patrick J. Michaels, Jennifer D. Rafacz & Nicolas Rüsch, 
Challenging the Public Stigma of Mental Illness: A Meta-Analysis of Outcome Studies, 63 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVS. 963, 969 (2012) (concluding, “Although contact and education both seem to significantly 
improve attitudes and behavioral intentions toward people with mental illness, contact seems to yield 
significantly better change, at least among adults.”). See also Patrick W. Corrigan, David Rowan, Amy 
Green, Robert Lundin, Philip River, Kyle Uphoff-Wasowski, Kurt White & Mary Anne Kubiak, 
Challenging Two Mental Illness Stigmas: Personal Responsibility and Dangerousness, 28 SCHIZOPHRENIA 
BULL. 293, 303 (2002). 
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in which environmental and societal factors contribute to the process of 
disablement, would enable nondisabled individuals to expand their view of 
deservingness, and they would grow less suspicious. 
The idea of facilitating contact between disabled and nondisabled members of 
society is not an easy one considering the stigma associated with disability and thus 
the reluctance of many to “come out of the disability closet.”245 Another issue is the 
continued marginalization of people with disabilities who might not be as present 
in higher education or in some sectors of the labor market. An effort to increase the 
presence of people with disabilities in all areas of life is thus crucial for increasing 
intergroup consciousness and trust. 
Increasing intergroup knowledge also holds the potential to increase public 
legitimacy for disability policies. To demonstrate this point, I examined how 
encountering the situations described in the experiments might change public 
support of disability accommodations. I divided the participants into a control 
group that composed about 20% of the research population and a treatment group 
that included the remaining participants. Both groups were asked whether “we, as a 
society, make it easier or more difficult for people to receive disability 
accommodations?”246 However, the control group was asked this question before 
undergoing the experiments (viewing the parking or Disneyland vignettes), and the 
treatment group was asked the question after the experiments had been conducted. 
In the combined data for both experiments, the treatment group was statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) more supportive of the idea of making it easier to obtain 
disability rights compared with the control group. 
This result suggests that when participants were nudged247 to think about 
situations that centered on dilemmas related to deservingness, they gave this issue 
some thought and became aware of the bias against those who appear less deserving 
(i.e., have nonvisible disabilities). This might explain these participants’ higher 
support of making it easier for people to receive disability accommodations. If this 
is indeed the case, in addition to the contact approach presented earlier, this finding 
proves the potential that an educational approach to tackling disability stigma, which 
exposes the public to dilemmas via campaigns, interventions, and so on, could work 
to increase intergroup knowledge.248 Similarly, inclusion of the Uniform System 
 
245. See generally ROBERT MCRUER, CRIP THEORY: CULTURAL SIGNS OF QUEERNESS AND 
DISABILITY 34 (2006); Samuels, supra note 57. 
246. The question read as follows: “The next question is about disability accommodations. 
These include, for example, being able to take a service dog into public places that usually do not allow 
animals; academic accommodations such as getting more time on exams; accommodations at the 
workplace such as special equipment or flexible work schedule, etc. Should we, as a society, make it 
easier or more difficult for people to receive disability accommodations?” The answers were given on 
a 1–7 Likert scale: 1) Much easier; 2) Somewhat easier; 3) A little easier; 4) Neither easier nor more 
difficult; 5) A little more difficult; 6) Somewhat more difficult; 7) Much more difficult. 
247. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
248. Corrigan & Gelb, supra note 243, at 394; Couture & Penn, supra note 243, at 293. 
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Regulations or state regulations that determine eligibility for disabled parking 
placards in the DMV’s written driving test could potentially increase awareness and 
reduce suspicion among new drivers. 
In 1995, the city of Houston, Texas, passed a bill establishing the Disabled 
Parking Volunteer Program,249 which trains citizens to become enforcers of the 
disabled parking rules and to issue citations to violators.250 All the volunteers are 
required to undergo a background check and a four-hour training before joining the 
force.251 Between 2015 and 2017, the Houston program had 400 volunteers who 
issued almost 17,000 citations.252 Similar volunteer programs exist across the 
country in places like Omaha, NE;253 Colorado Springs, CO;254 and Washington 
County, OR.255 
Training for these volunteer programs could implement the ideas about 
reframing disability deservingness. Incorporating contact with disabled individuals 
and knowledge about the fluid and diverse nature of disability into trainings would 
prevent overzealous volunteers from targeting those who might not be perceived as 
deserving but are in fact protected by law. 
CONCLUSION 
Everyone makes these assessments: They see a person park, they see that 
person walk away from the vehicle, they notice the disability space or the 
placard, and they make an instantaneous assessment in their own minds as 
to whether or not they just witnessed a legitimate or an abusive use of that 
parking space. And that perception then fuels their perceptive on the 
disability community, on government, on people in general . . . 
Because I am the deputy director here at the DMV, I’ve been trying to 
challenge my own perception, and so, what I’ve been doing lately is that 
when I am out and I see someone who is using a disability [parking] space 
who then walks away, I’ll note my assessment, I’ll note what my bias tends 
 
249. H.B. NO. 2083, 74 (R) § 1(e) (Tex. 1995), https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/
Text.aspx?LegSess=74R&Bill=HB2083 [https://perma.cc/NP3U-UAE2]. 
250. ParkHouston,  Volunteer  Parking  Enforcement  Program,  CITY  OF  HOUS., http://
www.houstontx.gov/parking/volunteer.html [https://perma.cc/DW8B-NM5G] (last visited Nov. 20, 
2019). 
251. Id. 
252. Catching People Abusing Handicap Parking Spots, KHOU11 (Feb. 17, 2017), https://
www.khou.com/article/news/investigations/stands-for-houston/catching-people-abusing-handicap-
parking-spots/409482710 [https://perma.cc/46LR-2WXF]. 
253. Handicap Parking Enforcement, OMAHA POLICE DEP’T,    
https://police.cityofomaha.org/community-involvement/volunteer-with-the-police-department/
handicap-parking-enforcement [https://perma.cc/MQV2-ULS6] (Nov. 20, 2019). 
254. Timothy M. O’Brien, Audit Report: Disability Parking Enforcement Program, DENVER 
AUDITOR (Aug. 2016), https://denverauditor.org/project/disability-parking-enforcement-program/ 
[https://perma.cc/VQG8-3LSP]. 
255. Disabled  Parking  Enforcement,  WASH.  COUNTY  SHERIFF’S  OFF.,  https:/
/www.co.washington.or.us/sheriff/vehiclesparking/disabled-parking-enforcement.cfm [https://
perma.cc/92FE-AVF9] ( last visited Nov. 20, 2019 ). 
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toward with that person . . . and then I make a note of the disability placard 
and I return to my office later and ask my staff to check the records and 
see what we find . . . It’s been interesting because I’ve been trying to check 
my own bias with our records and see what I find because there’s a lot [of 
tension] around this topic. 
This quote by David Brown of the California DMV summarizes the 
importance of raising awareness about fear of the disability con while showcasing 
the difficulties of challenging one’s biases against potential abuse, as those biases 
sneak up even in the minds of those who deal with issues of disability rights on an 
everyday basis. 
The issue of deservingness was found to be the primary force behind public 
perceptions about fairness and abuse of law. Laypeople would not mind making 
small sacrifices for others in situations of scarce resources, as long as that other fits 
within their idea of deserving individuals, in this case, a “real disabled person.” This 
finding, which was replicated across two settings, has the potential to inform 
policies that are outside of disability. Future research could, for example, focus on 
topics such as health-care policies,256 mass torts,257 or immigration.258 All of those 
areas of laws use a queue-like mechanism when allocating goods or determining 
eligibility for benefits or compensation (who should receive it and how much).259 
In these situations, issues of scarcity and of deservingness play a crucial part of the 
decision-making process. Using similar experimental methods, one could assess 
what influences public support for such policies and then use the findings to garner 
support for new policies. 
With regard to fear of the disability con, it is essential for policy makers, law 
enforcement personnel, disability rights advocates, and academics to continue to 
raise awareness of the topic, expand the views of deservingness with regard to 
disability rights, and take action to prevent the harassment of disabled individuals. 
These efforts are essential to guaranteeing that the rights that were granted only 
after a long social struggle will be implemented on the ground and for creating a 










256. See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 27, at 91–92, 100. 
257. See FEINBERG, supra note 29; Dauber, supra note 29, at 345, 348. 
258. See Bansak, Hainmueller & Hangartner, supra note 28. 
259. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 118, at 1657; Young, supra note 3, at 116. 
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APPENDIX  
Regression Tables and Figures for Parking Experiment YouGov and SSI 2 
Table 6. OLS Regression of Level of Suspicion in Parking Experiment (YouGov) 
Notes: Other control variables that were not found significant are race, family income, gender, 
and age. Level of suspicion measured on a scale of 1–5. 








 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Visibility of Disability -1.042*** -1.043*** -1.046*** -1.040*** -1.046*** 
 (0.0686) (0.0683) (0.0682) (0.0674) (0.0665) 
      












      
No Relationship w. Disability 
(ref.) -- -- -- -- 
 
 
Having a Cordial or Familial 

















Having a Disability  
 
-0.272** -0.275** -0.325*** 
 
-0.294*** 
  (0.0851) (0.0850) (0.0846) (0.0837) 
      
Female  -- -0.132 -0.119 -0.110 
   (0.0686) (0.0679) (0.0670) 
      
Having Some College 





      
Political Ideology 
(Liberal to Conservative) -- -- -- -- 
0.127*** 
(0.0246) 
      
 
Constant 2.785*** 2.897*** 2.969*** 3.184*** 
 
2.720*** 
R-square  0.1886 0.1981 0.2011 0.2201 0.2405 
Adjusted R-square 0.1870 0.1949 0.1971 0.2154 0.2351 
Sample Size (N) 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
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Table 7. OLS Regression of Level of Suspicion in Parking Experiment (SSI 2) 
Notes: Other control variables that were not found significant are race, family income, age, general 
suspicion level of others. Level of suspicion measured on a scale of 1–5. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Visibility of 


























       
Likelihood of 
people abusing the 











       
Extent law allows 
abuse  0.0689* 0.0924** 0.0849* 
0.0879** 0.0865* 
  (0.0321) (0.0332) (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0333) 
No Relationship 






































  -- (0.109) (0.108) (0.110) (0.110) 











       
















       
Political Ideology 
(Liberal to 







       
 





R-square  0.1665 0.1847 0.2010 0.2051 0.2068 0.2106 
Adjusted R-square 0.1651 0.1819 0.1959 0.1993 0.2002 0.2033 
Sample Size (N) 1,175 1,173 1,102 1,098 1,098 1,095 
